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Authors: Timothy Johnston
Tags: General, History, 20th Century, Europe, Political Science, Political Ideologies, Modern, Communism; Post-Communism & Socialism, Russia & the Former Soviet Union, Social History
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opinion’ have made use of sources. Lomagin’s study of ‘popular
118 See, C. Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, 2000), 3–30.
119 See Darnton for a similar comparison, Darnton, Great Cat Massacre, 3–5.
120 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 14.
Introduction xlv
opinion’ in wartime Leningrad, for example, relies heavily on secret police reports, svodki , and state prosecution files to measure the shifting mood in the besieged city. He concludes that the fall in prosecutions for anti-Soviet agitation in the summer of 1942 is evidence that the mood was improving. He does not even consider the possibility that what he is measuring is a decline in punishment and recording of anti-Soviet agitation, rather than the changing sentiments of the civilians them- selves. 121
The svodki that were central to Lomagin, and other authors’, source bases did not simply record public opinion but were also intended to play a role in shaping the consciousness of the Soviet citizenry. 122 They almost certainly over-represented negative sentiments about the Soviet government. Svodki also routinely laid the blame for the circulation of negative ideas at the feet of sect members, nationalists, foreigners, and counter-revolutionaries. 123 Ascribing rumour to these ‘suspect’ groups provided a vehicle for describing negative comments circulating in the community whilst attaching them to groups who were expected to harbour dissent, within the logic of the regime.
The suspect nature of these categories is demonstrated by a compari- son of two svodki concerning the reactions of the population of L’vov to the 1945 San Francisco conference. The original report, drafted on 19 May 1945, from L’vov to Kiev stated that, ‘In connection with the spreading of provocative rumours at the Krakov market’, some citizens had refused to receive payments in roubles. They believed that L’vov would soon be under American and British ‘occupation’ and roubles would be worthless. 124 A subsequent document, sent to Moscow six days later, concerning the mood in Western Ukraine stated that, ‘ ... in connection with the spreading by the agents of Polish reactionaries and Ukrainian German nationalists of various provocative rumours at the
121 N. Lomagin, ‘Soldiers at War: German Propaganda and Soviet Army Morale During the Battle of Leningrad, 1941–44’, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, 1306 (1998), 37–9. For similar criticism of Davies’s approach see: Hellbeck and Davies, ‘Letters to the Editor’, 437–40. See also S. Kotkin, ‘Review of S. Davies, ‘Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies , 50.4 (1998), 739–42.
122 Holquist, ‘“Information is the Alpha”’.
123 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politihceskoi Istorii, henceforth RGASPI f. 17, op. 122, d. 289, l. 60; op. 125, d. 517, ll. 36–7; d. 289, l. 62; Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv v Avtonomnoi Respublike Krym, henceforth GAARK f. 1, op. 1, d. 2550, l. 38, respectively.
124 Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads’kykh Obiednan’ Ukrainy, henceforth
TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1449, l. 25.
xlvi Being Soviet
Krakov Market in L’vov’, some citizens had refused to receive payment in roubles. 125 A series of ideologized abuse categories had been added to the rumours that were entirely the invention of Litvin, the recipient of the first report and sender of the second report.
Nonetheless, svodki can play a role, as part of a constituent picture, in illustrating how ordinary Soviet citizens deployed the ‘tactics of the habitat’ in this period. This book draws on as wide a diversity of Stalin- era source groups as possible. These sources fall into three broad categories. First, the state generated sources, such as the svodki , 126 information reports generated by agitators at party gatherings, 127 and a sample of 250 case files of the State Prosecution Organ of the Soviet Union from
118 See, C. Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, 2000), 3–30.
119 See Darnton for a similar comparison, Darnton, Great Cat Massacre, 3–5.
120 Geertz, Interpretation of Cultures, 14.
Introduction xlv
opinion’ in wartime Leningrad, for example, relies heavily on secret police reports, svodki , and state prosecution files to measure the shifting mood in the besieged city. He concludes that the fall in prosecutions for anti-Soviet agitation in the summer of 1942 is evidence that the mood was improving. He does not even consider the possibility that what he is measuring is a decline in punishment and recording of anti-Soviet agitation, rather than the changing sentiments of the civilians them- selves. 121
The svodki that were central to Lomagin, and other authors’, source bases did not simply record public opinion but were also intended to play a role in shaping the consciousness of the Soviet citizenry. 122 They almost certainly over-represented negative sentiments about the Soviet government. Svodki also routinely laid the blame for the circulation of negative ideas at the feet of sect members, nationalists, foreigners, and counter-revolutionaries. 123 Ascribing rumour to these ‘suspect’ groups provided a vehicle for describing negative comments circulating in the community whilst attaching them to groups who were expected to harbour dissent, within the logic of the regime.
The suspect nature of these categories is demonstrated by a compari- son of two svodki concerning the reactions of the population of L’vov to the 1945 San Francisco conference. The original report, drafted on 19 May 1945, from L’vov to Kiev stated that, ‘In connection with the spreading of provocative rumours at the Krakov market’, some citizens had refused to receive payments in roubles. They believed that L’vov would soon be under American and British ‘occupation’ and roubles would be worthless. 124 A subsequent document, sent to Moscow six days later, concerning the mood in Western Ukraine stated that, ‘ ... in connection with the spreading by the agents of Polish reactionaries and Ukrainian German nationalists of various provocative rumours at the
121 N. Lomagin, ‘Soldiers at War: German Propaganda and Soviet Army Morale During the Battle of Leningrad, 1941–44’, The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, 1306 (1998), 37–9. For similar criticism of Davies’s approach see: Hellbeck and Davies, ‘Letters to the Editor’, 437–40. See also S. Kotkin, ‘Review of S. Davies, ‘Popular Opinion in Stalin’s Russia’, Europe-Asia Studies , 50.4 (1998), 739–42.
122 Holquist, ‘“Information is the Alpha”’.
123 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politihceskoi Istorii, henceforth RGASPI f. 17, op. 122, d. 289, l. 60; op. 125, d. 517, ll. 36–7; d. 289, l. 62; Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv v Avtonomnoi Respublike Krym, henceforth GAARK f. 1, op. 1, d. 2550, l. 38, respectively.
124 Tsentral’nyi Derzhavnyi Arkhiv Hromads’kykh Obiednan’ Ukrainy, henceforth
TsDAHOU f. 1, op. 23, d. 1449, l. 25.
xlvi Being Soviet
Krakov Market in L’vov’, some citizens had refused to receive payment in roubles. 125 A series of ideologized abuse categories had been added to the rumours that were entirely the invention of Litvin, the recipient of the first report and sender of the second report.
Nonetheless, svodki can play a role, as part of a constituent picture, in illustrating how ordinary Soviet citizens deployed the ‘tactics of the habitat’ in this period. This book draws on as wide a diversity of Stalin- era source groups as possible. These sources fall into three broad categories. First, the state generated sources, such as the svodki , 126 information reports generated by agitators at party gatherings, 127 and a sample of 250 case files of the State Prosecution Organ of the Soviet Union from
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