âreformâ. But that meant the grafting of newpolitical methods on to the original stock, not imposing an alien blueprint to which no one was loyal. It was a crucial distinction. Kemalâs republic in Turkey was built on the foundations of Ottoman reform, not conjured from thin air. Its âofficialâ version of history proclaimed not Turkeyâs subservience to Europe, but the world-historical significance of the Turkish people. 5 Its political godfather (however quietly disowned) was Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876â1909), under whose rule state control of society was pressed forward vigorously. 6 Reza Shah Pahlevi (r. 1921â41) could invoke Iranâs ancient monarchial tradition to assert his authority over rebellious regions and tribes and strengthen the state. The emperorâs charter oath was the warrant to impose a much more centralized rule in Meiji Japan, and deny its opponents an ideological base. Even in China, where the end of the Châing dynasty signalled a more complete break with the past, the new nationalism laid claim to the Inner Asian patrimony bequeathed by the Châing, and revived the old system of household surveillance to regain social control in the turbulent 1920s.
Persistence was cultural as well as political. The role of religion, language and literature in creating national identities in Europe is a familiar story. There were several reasons why the nation-state idea developed more intensely in Europe than in other parts of Eurasia before 1914, not least the effects of the revolutions and wars that raged across much of the continent between 1789 and 1815. Across most of Eurasia (and including much of Eastern Europe), the link between culture and state had not followed the model that appeared in Western Europe. Absolute loyalty to a territorial state and its ruler conflicted with notions of an Islamic community of believers â the
umma
â and the autonomous authority of those who interpreted the Koran and the sharia. In the vast subcontinental empire of China, with its periphery of smaller, weaker or dependent states, the cockpit mentality of dynastic conflict and state-building that shaped Europeannationalism was conspicuously lacking. In Japan, two centuries of seclusion reinforced an intense suspicion of outsiders. But little need had arisen to identify Japaneseness with a strong central state. Yet, if the European obsession with the nation state as a union of culture and politics had little meaning elsewhere, the effort to bind society together with common values and practices (from diet and dress through to history and cosmology) was taken just as seriously. Across the rest of Eurasia, just as in Europe, traditions of learning were maintained and transmitted by teachers and texts. Around them were gathered the educated elites who enjoyed social prestige and exerted cultural authority. In Iran and China, this class was closely identified with the idea of the state. From Safavid times onward, the
ulama
asserted the claim that the Iranian stateâs first duty was to protect Shia Islam from the assaults of its enemies. The minority status of Shia in the Islamic world made this all the more urgent. In China, the scholar-gentry formed the administrative cadre as well as the cultural elite of the imperial system â a role, it seems likely, that they continued to fill in the ânationalistâ era that followed. Even in India, where British rule was gradually imposed from the mid eighteenth century, pre-colonial traditions survived, because they were already deeply embedded in vigorous vernacular cultures. Regional patriotisms, ideas of just government, and alternative visions of history coexisted uneasily with the cultural apparatus of the colonial regime. 7 In the late nineteenth century, when the Indian vernaculars were being transformed into ordered literary languages, regional sentiment acquired a powerful new means to express social and
Persistence was cultural as well as political. The role of religion, language and literature in creating national identities in Europe is a familiar story. There were several reasons why the nation-state idea developed more intensely in Europe than in other parts of Eurasia before 1914, not least the effects of the revolutions and wars that raged across much of the continent between 1789 and 1815. Across most of Eurasia (and including much of Eastern Europe), the link between culture and state had not followed the model that appeared in Western Europe. Absolute loyalty to a territorial state and its ruler conflicted with notions of an Islamic community of believers â the
umma
â and the autonomous authority of those who interpreted the Koran and the sharia. In the vast subcontinental empire of China, with its periphery of smaller, weaker or dependent states, the cockpit mentality of dynastic conflict and state-building that shaped Europeannationalism was conspicuously lacking. In Japan, two centuries of seclusion reinforced an intense suspicion of outsiders. But little need had arisen to identify Japaneseness with a strong central state. Yet, if the European obsession with the nation state as a union of culture and politics had little meaning elsewhere, the effort to bind society together with common values and practices (from diet and dress through to history and cosmology) was taken just as seriously. Across the rest of Eurasia, just as in Europe, traditions of learning were maintained and transmitted by teachers and texts. Around them were gathered the educated elites who enjoyed social prestige and exerted cultural authority. In Iran and China, this class was closely identified with the idea of the state. From Safavid times onward, the
ulama
asserted the claim that the Iranian stateâs first duty was to protect Shia Islam from the assaults of its enemies. The minority status of Shia in the Islamic world made this all the more urgent. In China, the scholar-gentry formed the administrative cadre as well as the cultural elite of the imperial system â a role, it seems likely, that they continued to fill in the ânationalistâ era that followed. Even in India, where British rule was gradually imposed from the mid eighteenth century, pre-colonial traditions survived, because they were already deeply embedded in vigorous vernacular cultures. Regional patriotisms, ideas of just government, and alternative visions of history coexisted uneasily with the cultural apparatus of the colonial regime. 7 In the late nineteenth century, when the Indian vernaculars were being transformed into ordered literary languages, regional sentiment acquired a powerful new means to express social and
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