outside aid to the Afghan resistance in 1978–92 and eventually became Pakistan’s “chosen instrument” inside Afghanistan until displaced from this position by the Taliban in 1996. The Hezb-e-Islami of Khalis (HiK) merged into other groups post-1992.
In reality, Afghan Islamist ideology had a limited impact with grassroots Afghanistan. Its leadership figures, with their roots among Afghanistan’s elites, found that to have mass appeal, they neededto adapt to more traditional Islamic beliefs and practices and with tribal and other loyalties that the Islamists opposed. Hekmatyar’s difficulty in carrying out such adaptation was among the reasons he has remained unpopular in the southern Pushtun heartland, where Sufic-influenced Islam and tribal loyalties remained strong. Despite having strong support from Pakistan, he was unable to gain the degree of support from Afghanistan’s Pushtuns that the Taliban had in 1996–2001.
Another source of opposition to traditional Afghan Islam is represented by Islamic fundamentalism. This looks at traditional Afghan practices and Sufic influences as syncretic accretions, with roots in the subcontinent or pre-Muslim society. Fundamentalism influences on Afghan Islam were represented by Deobandi and Wahabi or Salafist approaches, brought in from madrassas abroad and supported with foreign money. Fundamentalists may embrace the tools and technology of modernity; but they are not modernizers, looking instead to achieve the pure Islam of the distant past, with the Shias seen as the most damaging polluters of the pure spring. The Afghan Taliban has been, from their origin, fundamentalists, representing their leaderships’ schooling in Deobandi-influenced madrassas in the FATA. This underlay much of their hostility to Islamists in Afghanistan during the 1992–2001 civil war.
In the 1980s and 90s, the critique of Afghan Islamic practice was embodied in the Taliban’s Deobandi-based version of a maximalist Islamic ideology that emerged from the refugee camps. It was linked in this with what is termed Wahabism in Afghanistan, a movement that had been imported into Afghanistan to “reform” traditional Afghan Islam—with little success—in the years before 1978. Saudi financial assistance was accompanied with a strong push to spread its intolerant and restrictive Wahabi form of Islam, alien in any case to Afghanistan, with disastrous results. Saudi and Gulf money has subsidized the building and operations of maderi in Pakistan that produced the Taliban and other extremists now threatening the stability of Pakistan. During the 1980s, Wahabism became important, especially in the refugee camps and in madrassa in Pakistan, because of foreign funding. An autonomous Wahabi “kingdom” appeared in the Kunar valley.
Because these influences were strongest in Pakistan and because theAfghan exile population there was predominantly Pushtun, these outside influences were strongest amongst Pushtuns. Among non-Pushtuns, the Tajiks continued to be closer to traditional practices, despite the Islamist views of many of their political and military leaders. The Shia Hazaras went through a bloody sub-national civil war in the 1980s which saw supporters of Iran’s Islamic Revolution trying and failing to seize power in the Hazara Jat, but succeeding in killing or driving into exile many of the Hazara’s traditional religious and secular leaders.
Even though the Taliban’s ideology was hostile to traditional Afghan Islam, they were able to accommodate many of its grassroots believers in 1992–2001, using shared Pushtun ethnolinguistic links. But, during the Taliban’s 1996–2001 rule from Kabul, the increased influence of Al Qaeda and the importance of Arab funding meant that the Taliban paid more attention to the practices of outside supporters and less to that of their Pushtun clients, contributing to the loss of legitimacy the Taliban experienced among many Pushtuns by 2001.
The Afghan
In reality, Afghan Islamist ideology had a limited impact with grassroots Afghanistan. Its leadership figures, with their roots among Afghanistan’s elites, found that to have mass appeal, they neededto adapt to more traditional Islamic beliefs and practices and with tribal and other loyalties that the Islamists opposed. Hekmatyar’s difficulty in carrying out such adaptation was among the reasons he has remained unpopular in the southern Pushtun heartland, where Sufic-influenced Islam and tribal loyalties remained strong. Despite having strong support from Pakistan, he was unable to gain the degree of support from Afghanistan’s Pushtuns that the Taliban had in 1996–2001.
Another source of opposition to traditional Afghan Islam is represented by Islamic fundamentalism. This looks at traditional Afghan practices and Sufic influences as syncretic accretions, with roots in the subcontinent or pre-Muslim society. Fundamentalism influences on Afghan Islam were represented by Deobandi and Wahabi or Salafist approaches, brought in from madrassas abroad and supported with foreign money. Fundamentalists may embrace the tools and technology of modernity; but they are not modernizers, looking instead to achieve the pure Islam of the distant past, with the Shias seen as the most damaging polluters of the pure spring. The Afghan Taliban has been, from their origin, fundamentalists, representing their leaderships’ schooling in Deobandi-influenced madrassas in the FATA. This underlay much of their hostility to Islamists in Afghanistan during the 1992–2001 civil war.
In the 1980s and 90s, the critique of Afghan Islamic practice was embodied in the Taliban’s Deobandi-based version of a maximalist Islamic ideology that emerged from the refugee camps. It was linked in this with what is termed Wahabism in Afghanistan, a movement that had been imported into Afghanistan to “reform” traditional Afghan Islam—with little success—in the years before 1978. Saudi financial assistance was accompanied with a strong push to spread its intolerant and restrictive Wahabi form of Islam, alien in any case to Afghanistan, with disastrous results. Saudi and Gulf money has subsidized the building and operations of maderi in Pakistan that produced the Taliban and other extremists now threatening the stability of Pakistan. During the 1980s, Wahabism became important, especially in the refugee camps and in madrassa in Pakistan, because of foreign funding. An autonomous Wahabi “kingdom” appeared in the Kunar valley.
Because these influences were strongest in Pakistan and because theAfghan exile population there was predominantly Pushtun, these outside influences were strongest amongst Pushtuns. Among non-Pushtuns, the Tajiks continued to be closer to traditional practices, despite the Islamist views of many of their political and military leaders. The Shia Hazaras went through a bloody sub-national civil war in the 1980s which saw supporters of Iran’s Islamic Revolution trying and failing to seize power in the Hazara Jat, but succeeding in killing or driving into exile many of the Hazara’s traditional religious and secular leaders.
Even though the Taliban’s ideology was hostile to traditional Afghan Islam, they were able to accommodate many of its grassroots believers in 1992–2001, using shared Pushtun ethnolinguistic links. But, during the Taliban’s 1996–2001 rule from Kabul, the increased influence of Al Qaeda and the importance of Arab funding meant that the Taliban paid more attention to the practices of outside supporters and less to that of their Pushtun clients, contributing to the loss of legitimacy the Taliban experienced among many Pushtuns by 2001.
The Afghan
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