coast, unmanned drones and F-16s patrol Gaza’s sky, tanks, jeeps and APCs patrol Gaza’s border fence. Nor is there anything ‘symbolic’ about all this weaponry. Gaza, as a ‘hostile entity’, may legitimately (in Israeli eyes) be attacked at any moment from sea, air or land. Attacks are frequent though rarely noted by the international media; each kills or injures no more than a few Gazans. Warplanes also regularly bombard open spaces likely to be used as training grounds by resistance groups. Those massive explosions greatly distress children not yet recovered from the traumas of Cast Lead. Discussing all this with Nita, a Khan Younis cousin of one of my Balata friends, she told me that her youngest sibling, a five-year-old boy, has been permanently deafened by a sonic boom – another IDF terrorist technique. Then Nita offered to be my advisor and, crucially, my interpreter if I wished to visit some of the families bereaved since 1 January 2011. More of that anon.
Israel’s blockade uniquely handicaps Gaza, yet in one respect the Strip resembles other economically divided societies, its rich class seeming quite detached from the surrounding poverty. When Khalil introduced me to a nearby small supermarket I realised that Gaza’s privileged minority can buy anything transportable through tunnels. The rest of the population depends to some extent on food aid – from UNRWA, or an Islamic charity, or one of the few international NGOs still present. These keep their institutional heads well below the parapet; most offices and vehicles go unmarked, apart from Médecins Sans Frontières whose minivan twice caught my eye. In a month, a four-person International Solidarity Movement (ISM) team were the only foreigners I met; no expat workers were visible.
It upsets Gazans to hear sympathetic foreigners bewailing their ‘humanitarian crisis’. Everyone with whom I talked emphasisedthat they do not want to be regarded as people in need of ‘aid’, like earthquake or famine victims. Their crisis is
political
, not humanitarian. Given justice, they are perfectly capable of running as efficient an economy as anyone else. Their past proves them to be hard-working, ingenious people – and proud, hating their present dependence on hand-outs.
* * *
All those dire warnings about Bedouin robbers in the Sinai had prompted a change of routine; instead of cash in a money-belt I carried a Visa, my bank being confident that credit cards work in Gaza. However, Nabil, Khalil and Mehat were not so sure – they had long since exchanged banks for known and trusted money-changers . Gaza has a problem of which my ‘ivory tower’ bank knew nothing – a problem linked to what is politely known as ‘the informalisation of the economy’. In September 2007, when the ‘enemy entity’ label was slapped on the Strip, Israel’s banks ended all direct transactions with Gaza’s banks: future dealings could be done only through the Gaza banks’ head offices in Ramallah. But Israeli regulations prevented large currency transfers from the West Bank to the Strip without IDF permission – not easily obtained. Gazans therefore suffer from a shortage of hard cash. And money-changers, who employ their own subterranean methods of acquiring shekels and dollars, have become more powerful than the spancelled bankers.
By 2011 local observers – people well placed to judge – reckoned that more than two-thirds of Gaza’s economic activity was tunne-lrelated , centred on goods ‘smuggled’ from Egypt – and points beyond. I object to the term smuggled; its criminal connotation seems unfair since the blockade has left Gazans with no alternative but to transport goods furtively. Predictably this nice distinction irritated my Fatah friends who argued that Hamas runs the tunnel trade to fill their own government coffers. This no doubt is truebut how else are they to fill them, given the Israel/US-led blockage of funding?
Gallantly Mehat
Israel’s blockade uniquely handicaps Gaza, yet in one respect the Strip resembles other economically divided societies, its rich class seeming quite detached from the surrounding poverty. When Khalil introduced me to a nearby small supermarket I realised that Gaza’s privileged minority can buy anything transportable through tunnels. The rest of the population depends to some extent on food aid – from UNRWA, or an Islamic charity, or one of the few international NGOs still present. These keep their institutional heads well below the parapet; most offices and vehicles go unmarked, apart from Médecins Sans Frontières whose minivan twice caught my eye. In a month, a four-person International Solidarity Movement (ISM) team were the only foreigners I met; no expat workers were visible.
It upsets Gazans to hear sympathetic foreigners bewailing their ‘humanitarian crisis’. Everyone with whom I talked emphasisedthat they do not want to be regarded as people in need of ‘aid’, like earthquake or famine victims. Their crisis is
political
, not humanitarian. Given justice, they are perfectly capable of running as efficient an economy as anyone else. Their past proves them to be hard-working, ingenious people – and proud, hating their present dependence on hand-outs.
* * *
All those dire warnings about Bedouin robbers in the Sinai had prompted a change of routine; instead of cash in a money-belt I carried a Visa, my bank being confident that credit cards work in Gaza. However, Nabil, Khalil and Mehat were not so sure – they had long since exchanged banks for known and trusted money-changers . Gaza has a problem of which my ‘ivory tower’ bank knew nothing – a problem linked to what is politely known as ‘the informalisation of the economy’. In September 2007, when the ‘enemy entity’ label was slapped on the Strip, Israel’s banks ended all direct transactions with Gaza’s banks: future dealings could be done only through the Gaza banks’ head offices in Ramallah. But Israeli regulations prevented large currency transfers from the West Bank to the Strip without IDF permission – not easily obtained. Gazans therefore suffer from a shortage of hard cash. And money-changers, who employ their own subterranean methods of acquiring shekels and dollars, have become more powerful than the spancelled bankers.
By 2011 local observers – people well placed to judge – reckoned that more than two-thirds of Gaza’s economic activity was tunne-lrelated , centred on goods ‘smuggled’ from Egypt – and points beyond. I object to the term smuggled; its criminal connotation seems unfair since the blockade has left Gazans with no alternative but to transport goods furtively. Predictably this nice distinction irritated my Fatah friends who argued that Hamas runs the tunnel trade to fill their own government coffers. This no doubt is truebut how else are they to fill them, given the Israel/US-led blockage of funding?
Gallantly Mehat
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