Read Online A History of Strategy by Martin van Creveld - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Martin van Creveld
Ads: Link
enemy’s lines of operations without exposing one’s own. Doing so would lead to the enemy’s surrender, as actually happened to the Austrians at Ulm in 1805, or else to a battle in which he would be placed at a grave disadvantage, as happened to the Austrians at Marengo in 1800 and to the Prussians at Jena in 1806. Thus was born the
manoeuvre sur les
derrieres
, a method of operation by which one part of the army would hold the enemy while the other, if possible while using some natural obstacle in order to conceal and protect itself, would march around him and fall upon his rear. As Jomini very sensibly wrote, an army with two different lines of operations running back to two different bases would be less exposed to this sort of maneuver than its enemy who possessed only one. Particularly if the lines in question formed an obtuse angle rather an acute one. The fact that he spoke of the theater of war as a “chessboard” and presented his idea in an old-fashioned geometric manner reminiscent of von Bülow detracts nothing from its validity.
The second most important maneuver advocated by Jomini consisted of operating on internal (what von Bülow called diverging) lines. A blue army might find itself between two red ones. That was what had happened to Napoleon during his Italian campaign of 1796 and again in those of 1813 and 1814. Such a situation was not without its dangers. But it was also a source of opportunity. Separated from each other, the red forces would find it difficult to unite and thus bring superior force to bear. Conversely, the blue army was already concentrated and only a short distance away from each red force. These advantages might be used to deliver a swift, sharp blow at one red force before the other could intervene. Next, blue would turn around and the process would be repeated against the other. A perfect example, and one which shows the continuing relevance of Jomini even in the age of air warfare which he never contemplated, is Israel’s conduct of the 1967 war against three Arab countries. Each of whom, being separated from the rest by long and tenuous lines of communications, was attacked and defeated in its turn.
Whatever the precise maneuver selected, it was always a question of bringing superior force to bear against the decisive point. Given their importance as centers of communication, capitals were always decisive points. So, to a lesser degree, were road junctions, river crossings, fortresses which blocked or dominated a road, and the like. Another type of decisive point was one from which red
’
s line of operations could be threatened, forcing him either to retreat from his positions or else turn around and fight. If he tried to do the second without doing the first his forces would become divided. That in turn might present blue with an opportunity to beat them in detail.
In a certain sense, the maneuvers advocated by Jomini had always existed. From at least Hannibal on, armies had not only fought each other front to front but sought to outflank each other and surround each other. Before the middle of the 18th century, however, by and large there were no lines of operations to threaten or cut. Moreover, as explained earlier, primitive communications and the fact that no formations of all arms existed compelled armies to stick closely together and only permitted them to engage each other in battle by mutual consent. Given the vastly increased forces made available by the introduction of general conscription in 1791, first Carnot and then Napoleon had been compelled to disperse them and form them into formations of all arms whether they wanted to or not. Once the machinery for commanding such dispersed formations had also been created in the form of the
état major
, these changes greatly increased the repertoire of strategic maneuvers. It was the later that Jomini put into systematic form and codified.
Jomini’s earliest work on strategy, the
Treatise on Grand Operations of
manoeuvre sur les
derrieres
, a method of operation by which one part of the army would hold the enemy while the other, if possible while using some natural obstacle in order to conceal and protect itself, would march around him and fall upon his rear. As Jomini very sensibly wrote, an army with two different lines of operations running back to two different bases would be less exposed to this sort of maneuver than its enemy who possessed only one. Particularly if the lines in question formed an obtuse angle rather an acute one. The fact that he spoke of the theater of war as a “chessboard” and presented his idea in an old-fashioned geometric manner reminiscent of von Bülow detracts nothing from its validity.
The second most important maneuver advocated by Jomini consisted of operating on internal (what von Bülow called diverging) lines. A blue army might find itself between two red ones. That was what had happened to Napoleon during his Italian campaign of 1796 and again in those of 1813 and 1814. Such a situation was not without its dangers. But it was also a source of opportunity. Separated from each other, the red forces would find it difficult to unite and thus bring superior force to bear. Conversely, the blue army was already concentrated and only a short distance away from each red force. These advantages might be used to deliver a swift, sharp blow at one red force before the other could intervene. Next, blue would turn around and the process would be repeated against the other. A perfect example, and one which shows the continuing relevance of Jomini even in the age of air warfare which he never contemplated, is Israel’s conduct of the 1967 war against three Arab countries. Each of whom, being separated from the rest by long and tenuous lines of communications, was attacked and defeated in its turn.
Whatever the precise maneuver selected, it was always a question of bringing superior force to bear against the decisive point. Given their importance as centers of communication, capitals were always decisive points. So, to a lesser degree, were road junctions, river crossings, fortresses which blocked or dominated a road, and the like. Another type of decisive point was one from which red
’
s line of operations could be threatened, forcing him either to retreat from his positions or else turn around and fight. If he tried to do the second without doing the first his forces would become divided. That in turn might present blue with an opportunity to beat them in detail.
In a certain sense, the maneuvers advocated by Jomini had always existed. From at least Hannibal on, armies had not only fought each other front to front but sought to outflank each other and surround each other. Before the middle of the 18th century, however, by and large there were no lines of operations to threaten or cut. Moreover, as explained earlier, primitive communications and the fact that no formations of all arms existed compelled armies to stick closely together and only permitted them to engage each other in battle by mutual consent. Given the vastly increased forces made available by the introduction of general conscription in 1791, first Carnot and then Napoleon had been compelled to disperse them and form them into formations of all arms whether they wanted to or not. Once the machinery for commanding such dispersed formations had also been created in the form of the
état major
, these changes greatly increased the repertoire of strategic maneuvers. It was the later that Jomini put into systematic form and codified.
Jomini’s earliest work on strategy, the
Treatise on Grand Operations of
Similar Books
