soon,” wrote John Quincy Adams, the American ambassador in St. Petersburg, on October 11, 1811, “there is . . . nobody who thinks it possible it should be postponed longer than until next summer.” Napoleon was at the apogee of his power. The stupendous French forces gathering along the Russian frontier during the winter and spring of 1812 could not be hidden, and they looked invincible. By June 1812 his Grand Army had grown to an astonishing 600,000 plus, the largest in history. Czar Alexander could summon less than half that number, and perhaps only a third. The belief that Russia would be on her knees in a matter of weeks was all but universal.
War between Napoleon and Alexander had appeared certain since at least December 31, 1810. On that date the czar issued a ukase (decree) that opened trade with Britain while imposing high tariffs on the French, thus breaking Napoleon’s continental trading system and ending Russia’s alliance with France. Knowing full well how violent Napoleon’s reaction would be, Alexander prepared for war. Few observers expected him to be able to withstand Bonaparte, but Alexander was determined to resist to the last. In the winter of 1811–12, General Mikhail Kutuzov defeated Russia’s old nemesis the Turks, ending for the moment their interminable conflict, which had flared up again in 1811. Kutuzov’s force could then combine with other elements of the Russian army and concentrate on the French and their allies. In April 1812 the czar further improved his position by making an alliance with Sweden, eliminating the possibility of Bernadotte’s army attacking St. Petersburg while Napoleon was invading Russia’s heartland.
In May, even as Bonaparte’s hordes were gathering along the Russian border, he demonstrated to the world his dominion over Europe by throwing a lavish ball for himself in Dresden, the capital of Saxony. The proud princes and monarchs of Europe, including those of Prussia and Austria, were required to attend and pay homage to their new master at his grand soiree. When the reluctant guests were assembled in the lavish ballroom of the King of Saxony, the crowd suddenly grew silent, and then a loud voice announced, “the emperor!” After a pause, Napoleon, dressed in his green uniform, made a dramatic, solitary entrance. His message was clear enough; he was not just the Emperor of France. He was The Emperor —certainly of Europe, but after that, who knew? In June 1812 it was hard to imagine what country, or what coalition, could curb his unlimited ambition. Once he subdued Russia and pacified Spain, Britain would stand alone. Could she survive the tidal wave that was sure to follow? It seemed unlikely.
The emperor had convinced nearly everyone that he was unbeatable, and Madison, it would seem, believed he was—at least for the moment. To be sure, Napoleon had 250,000 troops stuck in Spain for four years, unable to defeat the guerrillas and their British allies. Of course, it was Joseph Bonaparte leading the French army there, not his brother. It was widely assumed that once Napoleon turned his full attention to the Iberian Peninsula, he would prevail. Eventually the French dictator would overreach, Madison thought, and that would be the end of him. But for now he was supreme and a useful lever against the British.
In the wake of the grand May ball, Napoleon traveled to the front and took personal command of the Grand Army, his confidence—like that of his generals— absolute. Ignoring the yearning of all Europeans, including his own people, for an end to the mass killing that had been going on for twenty years, he was determined to bring Russia to heel. Once he had done so, his dominance of the European mainland would be complete. Britain would then be in danger of seeing the French dictator, in the not too distant future, strutting in London.
It appeared likely that after subduing Russia, Bonaparte would force the small British army out of Spain and
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