Read Online Who Am I and If So How Many? by Richard David Precht - Free Book Online Page A

ask the experts, such as psychologists, what the self really is. The psychologists nod their heads, knit their brows, and exchange meaningful glances and a few words, then knit their brows still more tightly. ‘Well, you know,’ says one, ‘we are not likely to do away with the self. But my colleagues and I disagree about what the self might be. We cannot regard the self as a certainty, because psychology, as you probably know, is a science, and scientists define as existing only what they can see, hear, or measure. And that is not true of the self. If there is a self, it derives from something; Mr Hume is correct on that score. The question is only: from what? Do we derive the self from sensations – is there a sense of self? – or from thoughts – an idea of self? We’re not quite sure about this. The self acts like a switchboard for our will and judgment. We like to draw a distinction between self-concept and self-esteem. The self-concept tells us how we perceive ourselves. In order to do so, we have to reintroduce the “I,” but just as a minor construct to function as a contrast to “me.” The two share a task: the “I” acts, and the “me” judges the action. And self-esteem is the very subjective evidence that documents the “me” to the “I.” We have observed and described hundreds of thousands of people having this soliloquy. But on behalf of William James, who came up with these ideas, we ask that you refrain from asking for proof. That is just the way it is. God – or Darwin, or whoever – knows why.’
    That is as far as psychology gets us. Of course this depiction is greatly abridged, and psychology is a vast arena with many differenttheories and schools. But it is also apparent that psychology cannot provide a clear and simple reply to the question of the self. The remaining option is to consult the neuroscientists, who have often weighed in vociferously in recent years. More than everyone else, it would appear, they feel that they are now best suited to answer the question. The answer of many (or even all) neuroscientists to the question of whether there is a self is ‘No! There is no self. No one has ever been or possessed a self! There is no actual core of the self. David Hume and Ernst Mach were absolutely right: the self is an illusion!’
    To understand their answer, one must of course ask what kind of evidence it would take to persuade a neuroscientist that the self has been located. Would it be enough to find a region, an area, or a center in the brain that controls or generates the self? Most likely not, because then the scientist would examine the control mechanisms and ascertain that this center, like all centers in the brain, does not function independently but is connected to others. And he or she would examine the neurons, the transmission of electrical impulses, and the chemical reactions, and conclude that the self is nothing but a complex electrochemical mechanism, somewhat like the way a child might cut open a talking doll and find nothing but a mechanical device inside.
    Now common sense wins out, and, fortunately, no such center of the self can be pinpointed. That is very good news, and certainly not disappointing, as many a neuroscientist enjoys pointing out. The famous anatomist Rudolf Virchow gleefully disabused philosophers of the existence of the self back in the nineteenth century with this statement: ‘I have opened up thousands of corpses, but I never managed to see a soul.’ Even those of us who are not religious would surely greet that finding with a cry of ‘Thank God!’ Not finding a soul or a self is of course far better than finding a self that could be picked apart and demystified.
    So there we have it: there is no center of the self. That is hardly surprising, because who – aside from René Descartes with his pineal gland – believed so anyway? No noted philosopher in thepast two hundred years has claimed that the self is a material substance in