before him and stood as the clerk snapped open a sheet of paper to announce the decision. As the clerk read the verdict, it took Malevergne a moment to fully comprehend what had just happened. In fact, he thought he’d heard wrong and asked the clerk to repeat what had just been read.
Who knew why he should be spared while the others stood convicted, but there it was. Before the court-martial in Clermont-Ferrand, René Malevergne stood acquitted.
CHAPTER 4
Claridge’s
T he flight to London took twenty-one hours, and Patton, despite the rest he’d gotten on the Stratoliner, was cranky upon arrival. He and his companions—Doolittle, Colonels Kent Lambert, who was part of Patton’s staff, and Hoyt Vandenberg, who was with Doolittle, along with several other staff officers from the United States Army Air Force (both the army and navy had air commands before the air force formed its own separate branch of the United States military)—were driven to the famed Claridge’s Hotel, where accommodations awaited them. The city looked bleak to Patton. He noted in his diary later that it appeared “half alive with very few people, even soldiers, about.” For good measure, he commented acidly that “all the women are very homely and wear their clothes badly.”
One of the first persons Patton met the next morning at Norfolk House in London, headquarters for the Joint Allied Command, was an old friend, Major General Lucian Truscott, who was there to brief him and Doolittle on the existing outline for the invasion. First, second, and third drafts of the plans had been gone through by members of the British chiefs of staff’s offices and Eisenhower’s command, and the British were becoming more and more insistent that the Mediterranean side of the invasion predominate, Truscott told him. Naval resources were simply insufficient to attack both the Atlantic coast in Morocco and the coast of Algiers, they said. The more important part of the battle, because it was nearer to German forces in Tunisia, was on the Mediterranean side.
Not surprisingly, Patton’s mood was unimproved by this outline for invasion. The emphasis on the Mediterranean assault meant that he’d have to fight for resources for his western attack. Perhaps not surprisingly, Patton felt that his western command would be crucial to the overall success of the campaign. He asked Truscott and his staff to help himdraw up initial estimates and plans for his needs to help bolster his argument for shifting resources to that area. Then he suggested that Truscott join him in the actual invasion. According to Truscott, Patton was insistent: “Dammit, Lucian,” he said, “you don’t want to stay on any staff job in London when there’s a war going on. Why don’t you come with me? I’ll give you a command.”
A soldier acknowledged for his abilities at training men, Truscott had been sent to London earlier that year to observe the methods of Great Britain’s amphibious and commando forces under the command of Lord Admiral Louis Mountbatten. In the process, Truscott had become the U.S. Army’s chief expert on these relatively novel and ultimately crucial components of modern warfare. Early in the summer he had helped organize and staff the first American version of the British commando forces, which would become the U.S. Army Ranger group, headed by Colonel William O. Darby and trained, that summer, in Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Like Patton, Truscott had originally been a cavalry officer. The two had first met ten years earlier when both served under General Douglas MacArthur at Fort Myer, near Washington. Both had participated in the infamous rout of the Bonus Marchers from the Capitol Mall in July 1932. They’d subsequently become friends and met periodically over the years, including in 1941 in Louisiana, serving with opposing forces during that summer’s army war games. Though Lucian Truscott Jr.’s background was a far cry from Patton’s, the two
Who knew why he should be spared while the others stood convicted, but there it was. Before the court-martial in Clermont-Ferrand, René Malevergne stood acquitted.
CHAPTER 4
Claridge’s
T he flight to London took twenty-one hours, and Patton, despite the rest he’d gotten on the Stratoliner, was cranky upon arrival. He and his companions—Doolittle, Colonels Kent Lambert, who was part of Patton’s staff, and Hoyt Vandenberg, who was with Doolittle, along with several other staff officers from the United States Army Air Force (both the army and navy had air commands before the air force formed its own separate branch of the United States military)—were driven to the famed Claridge’s Hotel, where accommodations awaited them. The city looked bleak to Patton. He noted in his diary later that it appeared “half alive with very few people, even soldiers, about.” For good measure, he commented acidly that “all the women are very homely and wear their clothes badly.”
One of the first persons Patton met the next morning at Norfolk House in London, headquarters for the Joint Allied Command, was an old friend, Major General Lucian Truscott, who was there to brief him and Doolittle on the existing outline for the invasion. First, second, and third drafts of the plans had been gone through by members of the British chiefs of staff’s offices and Eisenhower’s command, and the British were becoming more and more insistent that the Mediterranean side of the invasion predominate, Truscott told him. Naval resources were simply insufficient to attack both the Atlantic coast in Morocco and the coast of Algiers, they said. The more important part of the battle, because it was nearer to German forces in Tunisia, was on the Mediterranean side.
Not surprisingly, Patton’s mood was unimproved by this outline for invasion. The emphasis on the Mediterranean assault meant that he’d have to fight for resources for his western attack. Perhaps not surprisingly, Patton felt that his western command would be crucial to the overall success of the campaign. He asked Truscott and his staff to help himdraw up initial estimates and plans for his needs to help bolster his argument for shifting resources to that area. Then he suggested that Truscott join him in the actual invasion. According to Truscott, Patton was insistent: “Dammit, Lucian,” he said, “you don’t want to stay on any staff job in London when there’s a war going on. Why don’t you come with me? I’ll give you a command.”
A soldier acknowledged for his abilities at training men, Truscott had been sent to London earlier that year to observe the methods of Great Britain’s amphibious and commando forces under the command of Lord Admiral Louis Mountbatten. In the process, Truscott had become the U.S. Army’s chief expert on these relatively novel and ultimately crucial components of modern warfare. Early in the summer he had helped organize and staff the first American version of the British commando forces, which would become the U.S. Army Ranger group, headed by Colonel William O. Darby and trained, that summer, in Northern Ireland and Scotland.
Like Patton, Truscott had originally been a cavalry officer. The two had first met ten years earlier when both served under General Douglas MacArthur at Fort Myer, near Washington. Both had participated in the infamous rout of the Bonus Marchers from the Capitol Mall in July 1932. They’d subsequently become friends and met periodically over the years, including in 1941 in Louisiana, serving with opposing forces during that summer’s army war games. Though Lucian Truscott Jr.’s background was a far cry from Patton’s, the two
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