Read Online The President's Call: Executive Leadership From FDR to George Bush by Judith E. Michaels - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Judith E. Michaels
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in turn, poisoned the atmosphere, creating "an environment of hostility and lack of trust in some agencies." Further, Reagan's appointees managed to move career managers "out of the decisionmaking loop" in some agencies, making them, "in a very basic sense . . . superfluous to decisionmaking" (ibid., 158).
The politicization and centralization of power within the White House during Reagan's activist presidency was a "continuation and acceleration of the developmental logic apparent in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years." But more than that, Reagan's success at strengthening the institutional presidency meant that he built "a set of administrative arrangements that by past standards proved coherent, well integrated, and eminently workable." These arrangements would also provide a model for future presidents (Moe 1991, 153, 157).
Not surprisingly, the Reagan administration is typically viewed as anti-bureaucracy. Nathan (1983), Newland (1983), Ingraham (1987), Kirschten (1983), Rosen (1981), Carroll et al. (1985), and Pfiffner (1985) have noted the anti-bureaucratic rhetoric and tone of the administration. Rubin (1985), Waterman (1989), and Harris and Milkis (1989) have studied administration treatment of specific regulatory and social welfare organizations and found that the Reagan appointees did in fact seem more intent on limiting organization missions than enhancing efficiency. (Maranto 1993, 683)
However, this view must be placed in context. It is clear that organizations whose goals were in conflict with administration ideals (such as social welfare and regulatory agencies) indeed experienced antibureaucratic administration. However, organizations with "ideologically neutral missions" experienced less tension, and relations in the defense bureaucracies were positively harmonious. "In short, the Reagan administration cannot be considered anti-bureaucracy as such; rather, it opposed bureaucracies with liberal missions and embraced those with conservative missions," such as the defense organizations (ibid., 696).
This administrative presidency also built on the changes of the Nixon years, transforming the nature of the bureaucracy itself. Selective promotion in the upper civil service grades, beginning with Nixon and picking up speed over the long Reagan years, along with changing ideas in society,
Page 39
worked to create a bureaucracy far more conservative than that of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This helped to reduce further internal agency tension by creating a bureaucracy predisposed to be in tune with a conservative administration (ibid., 696).
As Aberbach observed,
Reagan left Bush a bureaucracy that was at least somewhat more Republican and noticeably more conservative than had probably been the case in recent history . . . And [as noted above] he left a record that indicated how to structure the appointments process to find and place committed conservatives in appointive positions and how to use the new civil service law to influence the positioning of key top civil servants. (Aberbach 1991, 231-32)
Reagan's approach to the Democratic Congress was marked by adversarial stridency from the beginning.
Congress was largely viewed as an obstacle to be got around rather than as a partner in government. To help in overcoming congressional opposition to his policies, Reagan was able to use his prestige with the American public to influence the actions of those he dealt with "inside the Beltway." But he often went further and appealed directly to the American people to show their support for his policies by lobbying their representatives on his behalf. In competition with Congress, this strategy of "going public," made the best possible use of the president's own gifts. (King and Alston 1991, 275)
Reagan enlarged the role of the institutional presidency, keeping it center stage in American political consciousness. In doing so, he moved beyond traditional conservative notions of a presidency that merely responds to
The politicization and centralization of power within the White House during Reagan's activist presidency was a "continuation and acceleration of the developmental logic apparent in the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon years." But more than that, Reagan's success at strengthening the institutional presidency meant that he built "a set of administrative arrangements that by past standards proved coherent, well integrated, and eminently workable." These arrangements would also provide a model for future presidents (Moe 1991, 153, 157).
Not surprisingly, the Reagan administration is typically viewed as anti-bureaucracy. Nathan (1983), Newland (1983), Ingraham (1987), Kirschten (1983), Rosen (1981), Carroll et al. (1985), and Pfiffner (1985) have noted the anti-bureaucratic rhetoric and tone of the administration. Rubin (1985), Waterman (1989), and Harris and Milkis (1989) have studied administration treatment of specific regulatory and social welfare organizations and found that the Reagan appointees did in fact seem more intent on limiting organization missions than enhancing efficiency. (Maranto 1993, 683)
However, this view must be placed in context. It is clear that organizations whose goals were in conflict with administration ideals (such as social welfare and regulatory agencies) indeed experienced antibureaucratic administration. However, organizations with "ideologically neutral missions" experienced less tension, and relations in the defense bureaucracies were positively harmonious. "In short, the Reagan administration cannot be considered anti-bureaucracy as such; rather, it opposed bureaucracies with liberal missions and embraced those with conservative missions," such as the defense organizations (ibid., 696).
This administrative presidency also built on the changes of the Nixon years, transforming the nature of the bureaucracy itself. Selective promotion in the upper civil service grades, beginning with Nixon and picking up speed over the long Reagan years, along with changing ideas in society,
Page 39
worked to create a bureaucracy far more conservative than that of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This helped to reduce further internal agency tension by creating a bureaucracy predisposed to be in tune with a conservative administration (ibid., 696).
As Aberbach observed,
Reagan left Bush a bureaucracy that was at least somewhat more Republican and noticeably more conservative than had probably been the case in recent history . . . And [as noted above] he left a record that indicated how to structure the appointments process to find and place committed conservatives in appointive positions and how to use the new civil service law to influence the positioning of key top civil servants. (Aberbach 1991, 231-32)
Reagan's approach to the Democratic Congress was marked by adversarial stridency from the beginning.
Congress was largely viewed as an obstacle to be got around rather than as a partner in government. To help in overcoming congressional opposition to his policies, Reagan was able to use his prestige with the American public to influence the actions of those he dealt with "inside the Beltway." But he often went further and appealed directly to the American people to show their support for his policies by lobbying their representatives on his behalf. In competition with Congress, this strategy of "going public," made the best possible use of the president's own gifts. (King and Alston 1991, 275)
Reagan enlarged the role of the institutional presidency, keeping it center stage in American political consciousness. In doing so, he moved beyond traditional conservative notions of a presidency that merely responds to
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