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Authors: Mark Perry
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M1 Garand became the all-purpose rifle for the army and one of the most celebrated and reliable infantry weapons in history.
MacArthur also began to think in greater detail about Eisenhower’s ideas on industrial mobilization, Patton’s ideas on tank warfare, and Benny Foulois’s plan to develop new fighters and bombers. It was Foulois’s views that provided him with his greatest intellectual challenge.
Although he didn’t dismiss Foulois’s claim that one day the sky would be filled with fighters and bombers, MacArthur disagreed with Foulois’s notion that the army air corps should be made a separate military service—a U.S. Air Force, with its own chain of command. MacArthur was willing to concede that the future of warfare would include fighters and bombers, but he wanted to make sure they were under the army’s command. His views had nothing to do with warfare and everything to do with interservice rivalry. The army’s retention of its air arm would enable it to garner a larger share of the military budget at the expense of the navy, which is what MacArthur really wanted. But much as Foulois liked MacArthur, the air corps head did not agree that the air corps should take a lower public profile.
In the wake of the airmail scandal, Foulois ordered six B-10 bombers on an adventuresome flight from Washington, D.C., to Fairbanks, Alaska, and back. But Foulois kept the mission secret from MacArthur, primarily because the army chief was then engaged with the navy in delicate negotiations over which service would be responsible for U.S. coastal defenses. To head the mission, Foulois picked air corps flier Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, a fiery officer who had been taught to fly by the Wright brothers and was a respected survivor of the airmail fiasco. The Arnold mission was a success, with the six B-10s leaving Washington in June and returning intact on August 20, 1934. Arnold’s feat thrust him into the public limelight and dampened criticism of the air corps. But MacArthur was furious—Arnold’s Alaska mission buttressed Foulois’s argument that the air corps should be an independent service and interfered with MacArthur’s negotiations on coastal defense responsibilities with the navy. MacArthur took his retribution: He made certain that while Arnold received the Distinguished Flying Cross, none of the other mission pilots would be recognized. When Arnold protested, MacArthur angrily turned him away. Even so, in private, MacArthur was impressed: Arnold’s mission demonstrated the potential of a new generation of bombers and their long-range capabilities.
In the wake of Arnold’s mission, MacArthur decided that while he disagreed with the call for an independent air force, the establishment of a separate air headquarters
inside
the army was essential. To this end, he convinced Secretary of War Dern to appoint a civilian board to studyhow to most effectively use the army air corps. The board was headed up by former Secretary of War Newton Baker and included as a part of its mandate the identification of a replacement for Foulois. When the Baker board recommended the creation of a “General Headquarters, Air Force,” which would report directly to the chief of staff, MacArthur not only endorsed the decision, but also appointed Brigadier General Frank Andrews to head it. MacArthur’s appointment of Andrews came as a shock, for while the two had graduated from West Point within a year of each other, Andrews disliked MacArthur, blaming him for the air arm’s meager funding. For once, MacArthur brushed aside this personal animus and gave Andrews the job. Andrews was the air arm’s Fox Conner, the new U.S. Army Air Forces’ leading strategic thinker. But while Conner envisioned armies of tanks racing across the fields of northern France, Andrews envisioned fleets of aircraft flying over them.
The Arnold mission and the Baker report reinforced MacArthur’s new thinking on the future of warfare and the importance
MacArthur also began to think in greater detail about Eisenhower’s ideas on industrial mobilization, Patton’s ideas on tank warfare, and Benny Foulois’s plan to develop new fighters and bombers. It was Foulois’s views that provided him with his greatest intellectual challenge.
Although he didn’t dismiss Foulois’s claim that one day the sky would be filled with fighters and bombers, MacArthur disagreed with Foulois’s notion that the army air corps should be made a separate military service—a U.S. Air Force, with its own chain of command. MacArthur was willing to concede that the future of warfare would include fighters and bombers, but he wanted to make sure they were under the army’s command. His views had nothing to do with warfare and everything to do with interservice rivalry. The army’s retention of its air arm would enable it to garner a larger share of the military budget at the expense of the navy, which is what MacArthur really wanted. But much as Foulois liked MacArthur, the air corps head did not agree that the air corps should take a lower public profile.
In the wake of the airmail scandal, Foulois ordered six B-10 bombers on an adventuresome flight from Washington, D.C., to Fairbanks, Alaska, and back. But Foulois kept the mission secret from MacArthur, primarily because the army chief was then engaged with the navy in delicate negotiations over which service would be responsible for U.S. coastal defenses. To head the mission, Foulois picked air corps flier Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, a fiery officer who had been taught to fly by the Wright brothers and was a respected survivor of the airmail fiasco. The Arnold mission was a success, with the six B-10s leaving Washington in June and returning intact on August 20, 1934. Arnold’s feat thrust him into the public limelight and dampened criticism of the air corps. But MacArthur was furious—Arnold’s Alaska mission buttressed Foulois’s argument that the air corps should be an independent service and interfered with MacArthur’s negotiations on coastal defense responsibilities with the navy. MacArthur took his retribution: He made certain that while Arnold received the Distinguished Flying Cross, none of the other mission pilots would be recognized. When Arnold protested, MacArthur angrily turned him away. Even so, in private, MacArthur was impressed: Arnold’s mission demonstrated the potential of a new generation of bombers and their long-range capabilities.
In the wake of Arnold’s mission, MacArthur decided that while he disagreed with the call for an independent air force, the establishment of a separate air headquarters
inside
the army was essential. To this end, he convinced Secretary of War Dern to appoint a civilian board to studyhow to most effectively use the army air corps. The board was headed up by former Secretary of War Newton Baker and included as a part of its mandate the identification of a replacement for Foulois. When the Baker board recommended the creation of a “General Headquarters, Air Force,” which would report directly to the chief of staff, MacArthur not only endorsed the decision, but also appointed Brigadier General Frank Andrews to head it. MacArthur’s appointment of Andrews came as a shock, for while the two had graduated from West Point within a year of each other, Andrews disliked MacArthur, blaming him for the air arm’s meager funding. For once, MacArthur brushed aside this personal animus and gave Andrews the job. Andrews was the air arm’s Fox Conner, the new U.S. Army Air Forces’ leading strategic thinker. But while Conner envisioned armies of tanks racing across the fields of northern France, Andrews envisioned fleets of aircraft flying over them.
The Arnold mission and the Baker report reinforced MacArthur’s new thinking on the future of warfare and the importance
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