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Authors: Michael Smith
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were rather clumsy as they were geometrical rather than algebraical and, when Dilly Knox came to study the subject ten years later, he invented the ‘rods’ and the process known as ‘buttoning up’, which used the same properties as I had done, but did so in a more effective way.
In January 1939, the French cryptanalysts showed Denniston, Knox and myself their methods, which were even clumsier than mine, and ended with a flourish and a dramatic ‘
Voici la méthode Française
’. They asked Knox if he had understood and he replied in a very bored way
‘’Pas du tout’
, meaning (I think) ‘
Pas du tout à fait
’ [sic]. Denniston and I rushed in with conciliatory remarks. The French were, however, delighted with the rods when Knox explained them and by the next interview had made a set of ‘
réglettes
’ of their own.
At these two interviews, the Poles were mainly silent but one of them gave a lengthy description in German of the recovery of throw-on indicators when the operators used pronounceable settings. During this exposition Knox kept muttering to Denniston, ‘But this is what Tiltman did’, while Denniston hushed him and told him to listen politely. Knox went and looked out of the window.
Some time in 1938 or 1939, I can’t remember when – Josh Cooper places the time as the autumn of 1938 and that suits me – we were given by the Poles or French cribs of four long steckered Enigma messages and, I believe, the
Stecker
-pairings. I think that at the time we did know how the
Stecker
worked, but I can’t remember who told us. There is an undated translation of a secret German document published in 1930 which describes the method of plugging of the
Stecker
, but does not give the cryptographic effect. This may have been the document given us by the French in 1931. Knox, [Oliver] Strachey, R. R. Jackson and I all worked on it in an effort to reconstruct the wiring, including the basic ‘diagonal’, which on the steckered Enigma was ABCD … Z and not QWERTZU … I don’t know why the others failed, but the reason I failed was because I assumed the turnover notch was on the wheel and not on the tyre. I believe Knox and Strachey were allowing for the turnover notch to be on the tyre. Later on, at Warsaw, the Poles, who must have considered us all very stupid, gave us the complete answer.
* The high-grade cipher machine used by the British armed forces during the Second World War
4
BREAKING AIR FORCE AND ARMY ENIGMA
RALPH ERSKINE
Introduction
GC&CS’s wartime solutions of plugboard Enigma owe much to Polish cryptanalysts, who were the first to solve it - in 1932. As is now well known, the Poles gave GC&CS a clone of plugboard Enigma in August 1939, following a meeting in Warsaw at the end of July. But it was not until January 1940 that GC&CS was able to solve any Enigma using new rotors that had come into service in December 1938. Hut 6, as it became known, did so using Polish methods until May 1940, when the
Heer
(German Army) and
Luftwaffe
(German Air Force) changed the indicating system used with Enigma. But even before then, Dilly Knox had improved significantly on the Polish methods. Alan Turing had also invented the British ‘bombe’, which bore little resemblance to the Polish bomba and was the basis of virtually all GC&CS’s successes against Enigma during the war after 1940.
Chapter 4 illustrates the fundamental importance of good intercept facilities, which were in short supply for much of the war. Indeed, Hut 6’s successes ultimately depended on the skills of the humble intercept operator and good, easily operated intercept sets. Although the contribution of the US Navy bombes to Hut 6’s work is now better known, it is not generally appreciated that the British intercept stations had enough high-quality sets only because of superior American production facilities and know-how. A British history of the important Army intercept station at Beaumanor concluded that the intercept
In January 1939, the French cryptanalysts showed Denniston, Knox and myself their methods, which were even clumsier than mine, and ended with a flourish and a dramatic ‘
Voici la méthode Française
’. They asked Knox if he had understood and he replied in a very bored way
‘’Pas du tout’
, meaning (I think) ‘
Pas du tout à fait
’ [sic]. Denniston and I rushed in with conciliatory remarks. The French were, however, delighted with the rods when Knox explained them and by the next interview had made a set of ‘
réglettes
’ of their own.
At these two interviews, the Poles were mainly silent but one of them gave a lengthy description in German of the recovery of throw-on indicators when the operators used pronounceable settings. During this exposition Knox kept muttering to Denniston, ‘But this is what Tiltman did’, while Denniston hushed him and told him to listen politely. Knox went and looked out of the window.
Some time in 1938 or 1939, I can’t remember when – Josh Cooper places the time as the autumn of 1938 and that suits me – we were given by the Poles or French cribs of four long steckered Enigma messages and, I believe, the
Stecker
-pairings. I think that at the time we did know how the
Stecker
worked, but I can’t remember who told us. There is an undated translation of a secret German document published in 1930 which describes the method of plugging of the
Stecker
, but does not give the cryptographic effect. This may have been the document given us by the French in 1931. Knox, [Oliver] Strachey, R. R. Jackson and I all worked on it in an effort to reconstruct the wiring, including the basic ‘diagonal’, which on the steckered Enigma was ABCD … Z and not QWERTZU … I don’t know why the others failed, but the reason I failed was because I assumed the turnover notch was on the wheel and not on the tyre. I believe Knox and Strachey were allowing for the turnover notch to be on the tyre. Later on, at Warsaw, the Poles, who must have considered us all very stupid, gave us the complete answer.
* The high-grade cipher machine used by the British armed forces during the Second World War
4
BREAKING AIR FORCE AND ARMY ENIGMA
RALPH ERSKINE
Introduction
GC&CS’s wartime solutions of plugboard Enigma owe much to Polish cryptanalysts, who were the first to solve it - in 1932. As is now well known, the Poles gave GC&CS a clone of plugboard Enigma in August 1939, following a meeting in Warsaw at the end of July. But it was not until January 1940 that GC&CS was able to solve any Enigma using new rotors that had come into service in December 1938. Hut 6, as it became known, did so using Polish methods until May 1940, when the
Heer
(German Army) and
Luftwaffe
(German Air Force) changed the indicating system used with Enigma. But even before then, Dilly Knox had improved significantly on the Polish methods. Alan Turing had also invented the British ‘bombe’, which bore little resemblance to the Polish bomba and was the basis of virtually all GC&CS’s successes against Enigma during the war after 1940.
Chapter 4 illustrates the fundamental importance of good intercept facilities, which were in short supply for much of the war. Indeed, Hut 6’s successes ultimately depended on the skills of the humble intercept operator and good, easily operated intercept sets. Although the contribution of the US Navy bombes to Hut 6’s work is now better known, it is not generally appreciated that the British intercept stations had enough high-quality sets only because of superior American production facilities and know-how. A British history of the important Army intercept station at Beaumanor concluded that the intercept
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