Read Online Striking Back: The 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre and Israel's Deadly Response by Aaron J. Klein - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Aaron J. Klein
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fearful and depressed mood of the hostages.” Genscher, who was shaken by the encounter, said, “The picture of the room will stay with me as long as I live. I will never forget those faces, full with fear, and yet full of hope.”
Genscher introduced himself to the hostages as the interior minister of West Germany. He spoke softly in German and Troeger translated. Genscher promised the Israeli hostages that he would do everything possible to help them. “How do you feel?” he asked. He glanced at the face of each man in the room and then asked whether they were willing to be flown abroad with their captors. The hostages nodded numbly in agreement. Genscher and Troeger filed out of the room. Troeger once again requested that he be held hostage in place of the Israeli athletes. Again, Issa refused.
The German incompetence during the hostage crisis was absolute. Their feeble attempts to free the Israelis were pathetic, doomed to failure. Schreiber was the first to propose “kidnapping” Issa, during their first, early morning meeting. After that, the negotiations team suggested snatching several of the captors as they came out of the apartment to pick up four heavy crates of food. Two undercover policemen wearing chefs’ uniforms complete with toques planned to help carry the food, then spring into action and overpower the terrorists. The scheme was inane. Issa requested that the food be delivered at 1400 hours , then brought in each crate by himself. To prove that the food was not poisoned or drugged, German tasters sampled each plate.
The next scheme to free the Israelis was equally harebrained. After lunch, twelve local policemen, chosen for their martial arts skills, were stationed on the roof of 31 Connollystrasse. Their orders were to burst into Apartment 1 through the air-conditioning vents and the windows. Their codeword: Sunshine. Ulrich Wagner, who would later become an expert in hostage negotiations, felt that the rescue team was unfit for the job. “They selected them, asking: have you shot a gun or whatever? That was it; they had no training, nothing.”
After going over the layout and position of the building’s air vents, the policemen were instructed to take over the roof. The inexperienced volunteers wore training suits over bulky bulletproof vests. Their mission: to surprise the terrorists and extricate the hostages without causing them injury.
Codeword Sunshine was never spoken. Live TV coverage showed the rescue team standing on the roof in their training suits. Every room in the Olympic Village had a TV: Issa watched the events unfold, in real time, on his own personal screen. He stepped out of the apartment yelling at the Germans that two hostages would be killed immediately if the police did not get off the roof. At 1800 hours , Schreiber gave orders to retreat, and the amateurish rescue mission was aborted.
Schreiber and his men tried to get an exact count of the number of terrorists they faced. Knowing their number would be essential to any successful rescue mission. They identified four terrorists, including Issa, simply because these men had popped their heads out of the second-floor windows and the third-floor balcony. The four-man count was revised once Genscher and Troeger returned to the crisis center and reported that there were at least four or five terrorists in the apartment. Miscounting your target guarantees failure. Schreiber and his men thought they were facing five terrorists—which is partly why, four hours later, their rescue mission would fail so abysmally.
11 DESTINATION: CAIRO
MUNICH, OLYMPIC VILLAGE
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1972, 2100H
The German plan was simple. The terrorists and their nine hostages would be transferred to Fürstenfeldbruck military airfield, where two separate police units would be waiting in complementary ambushes. The first would be sprung on the terrorist commanders.
Genscher introduced himself to the hostages as the interior minister of West Germany. He spoke softly in German and Troeger translated. Genscher promised the Israeli hostages that he would do everything possible to help them. “How do you feel?” he asked. He glanced at the face of each man in the room and then asked whether they were willing to be flown abroad with their captors. The hostages nodded numbly in agreement. Genscher and Troeger filed out of the room. Troeger once again requested that he be held hostage in place of the Israeli athletes. Again, Issa refused.
The German incompetence during the hostage crisis was absolute. Their feeble attempts to free the Israelis were pathetic, doomed to failure. Schreiber was the first to propose “kidnapping” Issa, during their first, early morning meeting. After that, the negotiations team suggested snatching several of the captors as they came out of the apartment to pick up four heavy crates of food. Two undercover policemen wearing chefs’ uniforms complete with toques planned to help carry the food, then spring into action and overpower the terrorists. The scheme was inane. Issa requested that the food be delivered at 1400 hours , then brought in each crate by himself. To prove that the food was not poisoned or drugged, German tasters sampled each plate.
The next scheme to free the Israelis was equally harebrained. After lunch, twelve local policemen, chosen for their martial arts skills, were stationed on the roof of 31 Connollystrasse. Their orders were to burst into Apartment 1 through the air-conditioning vents and the windows. Their codeword: Sunshine. Ulrich Wagner, who would later become an expert in hostage negotiations, felt that the rescue team was unfit for the job. “They selected them, asking: have you shot a gun or whatever? That was it; they had no training, nothing.”
After going over the layout and position of the building’s air vents, the policemen were instructed to take over the roof. The inexperienced volunteers wore training suits over bulky bulletproof vests. Their mission: to surprise the terrorists and extricate the hostages without causing them injury.
Codeword Sunshine was never spoken. Live TV coverage showed the rescue team standing on the roof in their training suits. Every room in the Olympic Village had a TV: Issa watched the events unfold, in real time, on his own personal screen. He stepped out of the apartment yelling at the Germans that two hostages would be killed immediately if the police did not get off the roof. At 1800 hours , Schreiber gave orders to retreat, and the amateurish rescue mission was aborted.
Schreiber and his men tried to get an exact count of the number of terrorists they faced. Knowing their number would be essential to any successful rescue mission. They identified four terrorists, including Issa, simply because these men had popped their heads out of the second-floor windows and the third-floor balcony. The four-man count was revised once Genscher and Troeger returned to the crisis center and reported that there were at least four or five terrorists in the apartment. Miscounting your target guarantees failure. Schreiber and his men thought they were facing five terrorists—which is partly why, four hours later, their rescue mission would fail so abysmally.
11 DESTINATION: CAIRO
MUNICH, OLYMPIC VILLAGE
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 5, 1972, 2100H
The German plan was simple. The terrorists and their nine hostages would be transferred to Fürstenfeldbruck military airfield, where two separate police units would be waiting in complementary ambushes. The first would be sprung on the terrorist commanders.
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