Read Online Sir Francis Walsingham by Derek Wilson - Free Book Online Page B

execute some commission for Cecil. It was only a few months later that he wrote a letter to the secretary which has often been referred to as the beginning of Walsingham’s public career. In fact, the contents make it quite clear that Walsingham was by now a well-established confidant of Cecil, specializing in foreign affairs. He wrote the letter at the behest of Throckmorton, who was too ill to attend to the matter in person. That, in itself, tells us that Francis was a trusted intermediarylikely to be listened to seriously by Cecil. A messenger, Robert Stewart, had arrived from the French Huguenot leaders with vital information but Elizabeth had refused to receive him. Stewart was known as a plain, outspoken Calvinist who could not trouble himself to master court etiquette. What he regarded as earnestly pleading God’s cause (ie the Huguenot cause) Elizabeth interpreted as presumptuous preaching. Moreover Stewart’s message was one Elizabeth had not wanted to hear. She was not prepared to intervene in France on the Huguenots’ behalf. Thus it was that Throckmorton pleaded on the messenger’s behalf. Walsingham, passing on his friend’s appeal, apologized for Stewart’s unsophisticated behaviour but insisted that queen and Council could not afford to neglect the information he brought across the Channel.
    In December Walsingham wrote again to Cecil, this time on his own behalf, to pass on intelligence which had come direct to him. He explained that he could not vouch for the accuracy of the information but:
    Weighing [the informant’s] earnest protestation of the credit of the party it came from, the nature of the matter as of the greatest importance, the malice of this present time, the allegiance and particular goodwill I owe to her majesty and the danger that might come to me by the concealing thereof if any such thing (which God defend) thereafter should happen, I saw in duty I could not forbear to write . . . I beseech your honour that I may without offence conclude that in this division that reigneth among us, there is less danger in fearing too much than too little and that there is nothing more dangerous than security. 12
    ‘Malice of this present time?’ ‘Division that reigneth among us?’ ‘Nothing more dangerous than security?’ These are alarming – and, perhaps, alarmist – words. What exactly was Francis concerned about and how realistic were his fears? To unravel the answers to those questions we must backtrack to the beginning of the reign. By 1558 the glory days when Henry VIII had contended fiercely for a place at the top table alongside Charles V and Francis I were long past. It was:
    in those years since Henry VIII’s death that the new Queen, and most of the men who for the next three decades were chiefly to counsel her, had come of age or served their political apprenticeships. It was their experience of England’s plight under Edward VI and Mary that shaped their approach and conditioned their thinking about their country’s foreign relations under Elizabeth. That chastening experience had given them a more realistic appreciation, than had been possible in the years of affluence, of England’s small stature alongside the Leviathans of the continent. They now knew that they had neither the men nor the money to compete on land with Habsburg and Valois in the way that Henry VIII and Wolsey had tried to compete. Their means would not stretch to conquer Scotland, let alone to conquer France. The loss of Calais, and their inability even to attempt its recovery, dramatically emphasized the lesson that the days of continental adventure were over. They had learned, too, that they must not look to foreign alliances to make good their own weakness. Henry VIII had discovered how little foreign allies were prepared to do for England’s benefit. Northumberland and Mary had shown how easily the friendly embraces of either of the great continental monarchies could develop into bear-hugs almost as