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achieve, how they fit into cultural beliefs, we cannot make sense of them. The nature and accepted justification of a practice echoes the normative beliefs that are prevalent in the culture and the behaviors that are prescribed and proscribed. Thus fgm , for example, epitomizes the cultural evaluation of female sexuality and culturally prescribed female behavior. These cultural evaluations are applied not only by individuals to others but also by individuals to themselves. fgm and rsc shape not only what is done to individuals but also their own self-perceptions. Thus in South Korea, for example, rsc was unknown before the start of American trusteeship of the country in 1945 but had become massively popular by the 1960s. Although the practice was entirely new to the country, once the discourse of rsc was entrenched the circumcision rate rose to over 100 percent of newborn baby boys, meaning that it was not confined to newborn babies. Many adult men choose to undergo circumcision in order to conform to the new dis- course surrounding their sexuality. 44
    A Foucauldian approach explains why choice cannot suffice as a normative transformer: the simple fact of individual choice cannot ren- der an outcome just, even against a background of liberal equal oppor- tunity. The fact that culture is interwoven with practices means that, in choosing to perform a particular practice, an individual is participating in a social form. While not completely dominated or determined, the
Fraser, ‘‘Foucault on Modern Power,’’ 135.
Ibid.
Pang et al., ‘‘Male Circumcision in South Korea,’’ 65.

    individual does not have control over that social form: she does not control its meanings and symbolizations. Moreover, she does not con- trol her desire to participate in it. In other words, Foucault’s approach raises both of the questions that inform this book: first, whether free choice is possible at all in the face of social construction, and second, the extent to which the options from which an individual can choose are themselves just. Practices are never followed in isolation. As such, their normative nature, just or unjust, is not determined by an individ- ual’s decision to participate in them. Their justice or injustice is cru- cially related to the role they play in the relevant culture. This is not to say that choice plays no normative role. Where practices do not epito- mize and transmit inequality, it will usually be up to the individual to choose whether or not to follow them, and coercion may render the practice unjust. Choice does not, however, suffice to render an outcome just: there are circumstances in which a chosen practice remains un- just, and this is because practices are inherently social and thus do not depend on individuals’ choices.
    This point may be clarified by considering a question that liberals often ask in discussions of the issues raised in this book: ‘‘If a woman wanted breast implants (for example) for herself, because she liked the way they look and feel, and not to please a man or to submit to patriar- chal norms, would that be alright?’’ 45 Indeed, many women who do have breast implants claim that the surgery is for themselves, not for their husbands, boyfriends, or men in general. 46 Foucault’s insistence that practices are always cultural suggests several points in response. Choosing to have breast implants regardless of the desires of actual men is not the same as choosing to have them immune from patriar- chal norms. It would be impossible to say that a woman’s desire for breast implants were independent of patriarchal norms unless she lived in a nonpatriarchal society. Her motivations, the meaning of the practice, and its effect on other people could not possibly be immune from patriarchal influence otherwise. Practices are cultural: they do not submit to the meanings that an individual wants them to have, either for herself or for others. We can see this by considering the