would respond quickly. The next day, no enemy fire was received, while several farmers came forward, curious about the strangers. No British or American soldiers had been in the area before. The farmers seemed tolerant but wary. Would the foreigners be staying long?
When the platoon went back to Fires two days later, they took back with them a white Taliban flag they had ripped from a tree. It wasn’t much, but it gave Staff Sgt. Matt Cartier, the platoon sergeant, something to build on.
“I told them,” he said, “we’d gone into Taliban territory and they couldn’t protect their own flag.”
Garcia had no intention of lugging the entire platoon around the battlefield. He had eight sectors to cover, 500 compounds to search, and a thousand irrigation ditches to cross. If the platoon stayed together, it could never dislodge the Taliban. He had to send out two to three squad patrols a day, often going in different directions.
“The Taliban will swarm a squad,” he said, “unless they fear indirect fire. My squad leaders had to believe they could call in fire anytime they wanted. The whole platoon had seen the air support Spokes Beardsley delivered. That made a difference.”
While 3rd Platoon was out on their operation, Lieutenant Colonel Morris emailed back to the families, “Despite taking tough losses in the first days in their area of operations, the Battalion has dusted itselfoff and continued to move forward.… I just conducted a memorial service for LCpls Catherwood, Boelk and Lopez from Kilo Company … will send you another update. In the meantime, we’ll be ‘getting some’!”
“Get some” means kill the enemy, and it was 3/5’s motto.
Sometimes IEDs struck unwary children in the fields, although for the most part the farmers knew which areas to avoid. The villagers allowed the Taliban to use children as shields. Out of fear and/or tribal loyalty, they kept quiet about the locations of the IEDs and the Taliban gangs. The tribes accepted callousness from the Taliban.
American firepower, on the other hand, angered and distressed the people. The image of Americans rolling about in large armored convoys or swooping in to burn an enemy village was a caricature. The people weren’t forcibly moved, as happened in Vietnam. Nor were there free fire zones or indiscriminate bombing.
The reality was more complicated. The Marine approach was to spread out a battalion across a district, clear it, and then turn it over to Afghan forces to hold. In Sangin, the tribes were firmly controlled by, and contributed to, the Taliban. And so the clearing operation became a brutal fight between the Marines and the insurgents. Usually, the Marines didn’t see the Taliban, and shot back after they were fired at. They struck the compounds, tree lines, and fields from which they received fire. Naturally, the farmers fled in fear and resentment.
This wasn’t happening just in 3rd Platoon’s area. A dozen platoon commanders in 3/5 were reacting like Garcia. A Marine spokesman claimed, “There is nothing out of the norm in terms of operations in Sangin.” But it wasn’t true. October marked the highest number of air strikes in two years, led by 3/5 in Sangin. And Kilo called in the most air strikes of any company, led by 3rd Platoon.
Sangin was a war of attrition, not counterinsurgency. Controlling the farmlands was psychological, not physical. Neither the Taliban nor the Marines could be everywhere. Each side has to send out small groups of men willing to fight when they bumped into the other side. Once one side flinched and avoided entering certain areas, the other side had won. When the Taliban could not sustain their losses, they would withdraw. To break the grip of the Taliban, Garcia’s challenge wasn’t so much the enemy; it was convincing his own Marines that they could survive seven months without being blown up.
Chapter 4
LEADERS FOUND
“We are battle-hardened, but still ordinary
When the platoon went back to Fires two days later, they took back with them a white Taliban flag they had ripped from a tree. It wasn’t much, but it gave Staff Sgt. Matt Cartier, the platoon sergeant, something to build on.
“I told them,” he said, “we’d gone into Taliban territory and they couldn’t protect their own flag.”
Garcia had no intention of lugging the entire platoon around the battlefield. He had eight sectors to cover, 500 compounds to search, and a thousand irrigation ditches to cross. If the platoon stayed together, it could never dislodge the Taliban. He had to send out two to three squad patrols a day, often going in different directions.
“The Taliban will swarm a squad,” he said, “unless they fear indirect fire. My squad leaders had to believe they could call in fire anytime they wanted. The whole platoon had seen the air support Spokes Beardsley delivered. That made a difference.”
While 3rd Platoon was out on their operation, Lieutenant Colonel Morris emailed back to the families, “Despite taking tough losses in the first days in their area of operations, the Battalion has dusted itselfoff and continued to move forward.… I just conducted a memorial service for LCpls Catherwood, Boelk and Lopez from Kilo Company … will send you another update. In the meantime, we’ll be ‘getting some’!”
“Get some” means kill the enemy, and it was 3/5’s motto.
Sometimes IEDs struck unwary children in the fields, although for the most part the farmers knew which areas to avoid. The villagers allowed the Taliban to use children as shields. Out of fear and/or tribal loyalty, they kept quiet about the locations of the IEDs and the Taliban gangs. The tribes accepted callousness from the Taliban.
American firepower, on the other hand, angered and distressed the people. The image of Americans rolling about in large armored convoys or swooping in to burn an enemy village was a caricature. The people weren’t forcibly moved, as happened in Vietnam. Nor were there free fire zones or indiscriminate bombing.
The reality was more complicated. The Marine approach was to spread out a battalion across a district, clear it, and then turn it over to Afghan forces to hold. In Sangin, the tribes were firmly controlled by, and contributed to, the Taliban. And so the clearing operation became a brutal fight between the Marines and the insurgents. Usually, the Marines didn’t see the Taliban, and shot back after they were fired at. They struck the compounds, tree lines, and fields from which they received fire. Naturally, the farmers fled in fear and resentment.
This wasn’t happening just in 3rd Platoon’s area. A dozen platoon commanders in 3/5 were reacting like Garcia. A Marine spokesman claimed, “There is nothing out of the norm in terms of operations in Sangin.” But it wasn’t true. October marked the highest number of air strikes in two years, led by 3/5 in Sangin. And Kilo called in the most air strikes of any company, led by 3rd Platoon.
Sangin was a war of attrition, not counterinsurgency. Controlling the farmlands was psychological, not physical. Neither the Taliban nor the Marines could be everywhere. Each side has to send out small groups of men willing to fight when they bumped into the other side. Once one side flinched and avoided entering certain areas, the other side had won. When the Taliban could not sustain their losses, they would withdraw. To break the grip of the Taliban, Garcia’s challenge wasn’t so much the enemy; it was convincing his own Marines that they could survive seven months without being blown up.
Chapter 4
LEADERS FOUND
“We are battle-hardened, but still ordinary
Similar Books
