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Authors: Lamar Waldron
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handful of “selected Cuban exile
leaders” who would become part of the coup plan, subject to approval
from Bobby and JFK. Most of Harry’s recommendations were accepted,
and five groups were selected. The hundreds of other Cuban exile
groups, many of whom had received lavish support from the CIA for
years, had their financial aid cut back severely or cut off completely,
creating much resentment.
The exile leaders and groups Harry, Bobby, and JFK chose were:
• Manual Artime, the extremely conservative former Bay of Pigs
leader and best friend of CIA agent E. Howard Hunt.
• Tony Varona, a former Cuban senator who had recently headed
the largest US-backed Cuban exile group, the CRC (Cuban Revo-
lutionary Council).
• Manolo Ray, head of JURE (Junta Revolucionaria Cubana), con-
sidered one of the most liberal exile groups, and hence distrusted
and disliked by Artime and Hunt.
28
LEGACY OF SECRECY
• Eloy Menoyo of the SNFE (Second National Front of Escambray),
also seen as very liberal; Harry called him “a man of action” because
(unlike many office-bound exile leaders) he had been willing to
personally lead raids into Cuba the previous year.
• The Cuban American US Army troops in officer training at Fort
Benning, Georgia, considered the cream of the Bay of Pigs veterans
from a military standpoint. This multiracial group of Cuban exiles
would be the first US troops into Cuba after the coup.
Many of these men had worked with Fidel and Almeida during the
Revolution and its immediate aftermath. One by one, they left Cuba or
were forced to flee. Now, Harry was trying to meld them into an effective
group that could help to rule Cuba after the coup, during the transition
to democracy and eventual free elections. But this goal proved difficult,
because their political differences were so great. Recently declassified
memos show the scope of Harry’s problem: As of June 26, 1963, an FBI
informant reported that “Menoyo would not be welcome” to work with
Ray’s JURE group, and on September 26, 1963, Artime told one of his
AMWORLD CIA case officers that “Menoyo . . . is indeed a traitor.”
Artime also disliked Ray, and memos from the summer of 1963 show
CIA officials lying to Artime, telling him “that [Ray] is not one of [the
CIA’s] chosen” leaders, when the CIA had actually being supporting
Ray with an average of $25,000 a month since late June 1963.18 If it had
been up to CIA officials like Richard Helms and E. Howard Hunt, Artime
would have been the sole exile leader receiving support, but that wasn’t
what the Kennedys wanted. After much work by Harry, by November
1963 Menoyo and Ray had met to reach a “working agreement,” and
exile informants began to report that Artime had reached an accommo-
dation with each man. Also on board were Tony Varona and the leader
of the Cuban exile troops at Fort Benning.19
The five were not a cohesive group, and their level of commitment to
Harry and Bobby varied. This was partially because Harry felt he had
to withhold some information about the coup plan from them (such as
Almeida’s identity), until the exile leader was fully committed to the
operation. For example, newly released CIA files cited here for the first
time confirm Harry’s account of meeting with Manolo Ray in September
1963. Shortly after that, Almeida’s name came up in a meeting between
Ray and his CIA case officer, but they both talked so cautiously that it’s
hard to tell just how much Harry or Bobby had told Ray about Almeida.
Menoyo was even more problematic, and as late as mid-November, after
months of wooing, Harry Williams was still trying to get him fully on
board.20
Chapter Two
29
Tony Varona had been eager to join Harry’s plan—perhaps too eager.
Unknown to Harry and Bobby, Varona had ties to mob bosses Santo
Trafficante and Johnny Rosselli. When the first round of CIA-Mafia plots
to assassinate Castro in 1959 failed, the
leaders” who would become part of the coup plan, subject to approval
from Bobby and JFK. Most of Harry’s recommendations were accepted,
and five groups were selected. The hundreds of other Cuban exile
groups, many of whom had received lavish support from the CIA for
years, had their financial aid cut back severely or cut off completely,
creating much resentment.
The exile leaders and groups Harry, Bobby, and JFK chose were:
• Manual Artime, the extremely conservative former Bay of Pigs
leader and best friend of CIA agent E. Howard Hunt.
• Tony Varona, a former Cuban senator who had recently headed
the largest US-backed Cuban exile group, the CRC (Cuban Revo-
lutionary Council).
• Manolo Ray, head of JURE (Junta Revolucionaria Cubana), con-
sidered one of the most liberal exile groups, and hence distrusted
and disliked by Artime and Hunt.
28
LEGACY OF SECRECY
• Eloy Menoyo of the SNFE (Second National Front of Escambray),
also seen as very liberal; Harry called him “a man of action” because
(unlike many office-bound exile leaders) he had been willing to
personally lead raids into Cuba the previous year.
• The Cuban American US Army troops in officer training at Fort
Benning, Georgia, considered the cream of the Bay of Pigs veterans
from a military standpoint. This multiracial group of Cuban exiles
would be the first US troops into Cuba after the coup.
Many of these men had worked with Fidel and Almeida during the
Revolution and its immediate aftermath. One by one, they left Cuba or
were forced to flee. Now, Harry was trying to meld them into an effective
group that could help to rule Cuba after the coup, during the transition
to democracy and eventual free elections. But this goal proved difficult,
because their political differences were so great. Recently declassified
memos show the scope of Harry’s problem: As of June 26, 1963, an FBI
informant reported that “Menoyo would not be welcome” to work with
Ray’s JURE group, and on September 26, 1963, Artime told one of his
AMWORLD CIA case officers that “Menoyo . . . is indeed a traitor.”
Artime also disliked Ray, and memos from the summer of 1963 show
CIA officials lying to Artime, telling him “that [Ray] is not one of [the
CIA’s] chosen” leaders, when the CIA had actually being supporting
Ray with an average of $25,000 a month since late June 1963.18 If it had
been up to CIA officials like Richard Helms and E. Howard Hunt, Artime
would have been the sole exile leader receiving support, but that wasn’t
what the Kennedys wanted. After much work by Harry, by November
1963 Menoyo and Ray had met to reach a “working agreement,” and
exile informants began to report that Artime had reached an accommo-
dation with each man. Also on board were Tony Varona and the leader
of the Cuban exile troops at Fort Benning.19
The five were not a cohesive group, and their level of commitment to
Harry and Bobby varied. This was partially because Harry felt he had
to withhold some information about the coup plan from them (such as
Almeida’s identity), until the exile leader was fully committed to the
operation. For example, newly released CIA files cited here for the first
time confirm Harry’s account of meeting with Manolo Ray in September
1963. Shortly after that, Almeida’s name came up in a meeting between
Ray and his CIA case officer, but they both talked so cautiously that it’s
hard to tell just how much Harry or Bobby had told Ray about Almeida.
Menoyo was even more problematic, and as late as mid-November, after
months of wooing, Harry Williams was still trying to get him fully on
board.20
Chapter Two
29
Tony Varona had been eager to join Harry’s plan—perhaps too eager.
Unknown to Harry and Bobby, Varona had ties to mob bosses Santo
Trafficante and Johnny Rosselli. When the first round of CIA-Mafia plots
to assassinate Castro in 1959 failed, the
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