Read Online Kursk Down by Clyde Burleson - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Clyde Burleson
Tags: HIS027000
Ads: Link
face. If the
Kursk
had been less badly savaged, he and the rest might have had a chance. The damage was there, though, so it was only a matter of hours. And that understanding may have brought him peace.
By this point, Dmitry’s head was aching, his mouth dry, and the contaminated air must have burned in his lungs. His friend, Rashid, had been writing as well. “We feel bad . . . we’re weakened by the effects of carbon monoxide from the fire . . .” Dmitry would have concurred. The devastating flames that had flared through every portion of the submarine consumed precious oxygen at a horrendous rate. It had left an air poisoned with carbon monoxide.
The survivors could now feel the effects of increasing air pressure in their ears. That condition had been explained clearly during training. Building air pressure indicated seawater was pouring into the boat. As the water entered, under hundreds of pounds of pressure from the depths, great bubbles of air were forced upward until trapped against the steel hull. Then, slowly but inexorably, breathable gas was being squeezed tighter and tighter by the rising waters, raising the pressure.
Rashid had written, “Pressure is increasing in the compartment . . . if we head for the surface, we won’t survive the compression. We won’t last for more than a day.
Their living space was damp and they could see their breath as they exhaled stale air. The situation had worsened by the hour and now most of them knew they would not be able to remain alive long enough for the Deep Sea Rescue Vehicles to be brought to the scene. The only way out was through the double-hatch escape chute—which was a form of suicide.
Where were their rescuers? Why hadn’t they come?
CHAPTER 5
12 August 2000—Barents Sea
L EADERS OF THE N ORTHERN F LEET AND R USSIAN N AVY were confronted with a series of disconcerting facts.
First, there had been an enormous undersea explosion. Second, the blast had originated in a sector assigned to the
Kursk
for patrol. Third, at least one officer on board the
Peter the Great
, and probably a great many more, was aware that a missile had been fired and that it struck the sea, causing an unusually dramatic eruption of water. Fourth, only a large attack submarine carried sufficient weaponry to produce such a hellacious submerged blast. Fifth, Captain Lyachin had called for permission to release a faulty torpedo. That transmission, according to the media, was picked up by the USNS
Loyal.
So there can be little doubt the call was made and that ranking officers on board the
Peter the Great
knew this.
Finally, the
Peter the Great
, a sophisticated heavy nuclear missile cruiser, had first-class submarine-detection abilities. It was operating in a full combat mode with all of its electronic gear searching for the
Kursk
. So it is likely the
Kursk
, along with other submarines in the area, was being tracked. If so, the explosions would have knocked the
Kursk
“off the scope.”
This information, taken as a whole, pointed to one strong conclusion. The flag rank officers immediately knew the
Kursk
was down and probably disabled.
Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, Northern Fleet commander, certainly faced a difficult reality. During his fleet’s much heralded sea games, and in the midst of an important governmental military funding battle, the pride of the Russian Navy had been damaged and possibly even lost. This situation confronted the admiral with several interrelated hard alternatives.
As an old submariner, he would have had instant concern for those on board the
Kursk
. And he would have known that survivors were trained to hold out as long as possible for help to arrive. In the U.S. Navy, sailors are aware they might have to sustain themselves for up to a week. Russian submariners must have about the same time horizon. While a week may seem an inordinate period, especially because many preparations are already in place and set for immediate use, massing for a deep-water
Kursk
had been less badly savaged, he and the rest might have had a chance. The damage was there, though, so it was only a matter of hours. And that understanding may have brought him peace.
By this point, Dmitry’s head was aching, his mouth dry, and the contaminated air must have burned in his lungs. His friend, Rashid, had been writing as well. “We feel bad . . . we’re weakened by the effects of carbon monoxide from the fire . . .” Dmitry would have concurred. The devastating flames that had flared through every portion of the submarine consumed precious oxygen at a horrendous rate. It had left an air poisoned with carbon monoxide.
The survivors could now feel the effects of increasing air pressure in their ears. That condition had been explained clearly during training. Building air pressure indicated seawater was pouring into the boat. As the water entered, under hundreds of pounds of pressure from the depths, great bubbles of air were forced upward until trapped against the steel hull. Then, slowly but inexorably, breathable gas was being squeezed tighter and tighter by the rising waters, raising the pressure.
Rashid had written, “Pressure is increasing in the compartment . . . if we head for the surface, we won’t survive the compression. We won’t last for more than a day.
Their living space was damp and they could see their breath as they exhaled stale air. The situation had worsened by the hour and now most of them knew they would not be able to remain alive long enough for the Deep Sea Rescue Vehicles to be brought to the scene. The only way out was through the double-hatch escape chute—which was a form of suicide.
Where were their rescuers? Why hadn’t they come?
CHAPTER 5
12 August 2000—Barents Sea
L EADERS OF THE N ORTHERN F LEET AND R USSIAN N AVY were confronted with a series of disconcerting facts.
First, there had been an enormous undersea explosion. Second, the blast had originated in a sector assigned to the
Kursk
for patrol. Third, at least one officer on board the
Peter the Great
, and probably a great many more, was aware that a missile had been fired and that it struck the sea, causing an unusually dramatic eruption of water. Fourth, only a large attack submarine carried sufficient weaponry to produce such a hellacious submerged blast. Fifth, Captain Lyachin had called for permission to release a faulty torpedo. That transmission, according to the media, was picked up by the USNS
Loyal.
So there can be little doubt the call was made and that ranking officers on board the
Peter the Great
knew this.
Finally, the
Peter the Great
, a sophisticated heavy nuclear missile cruiser, had first-class submarine-detection abilities. It was operating in a full combat mode with all of its electronic gear searching for the
Kursk
. So it is likely the
Kursk
, along with other submarines in the area, was being tracked. If so, the explosions would have knocked the
Kursk
“off the scope.”
This information, taken as a whole, pointed to one strong conclusion. The flag rank officers immediately knew the
Kursk
was down and probably disabled.
Admiral Vyacheslav Popov, Northern Fleet commander, certainly faced a difficult reality. During his fleet’s much heralded sea games, and in the midst of an important governmental military funding battle, the pride of the Russian Navy had been damaged and possibly even lost. This situation confronted the admiral with several interrelated hard alternatives.
As an old submariner, he would have had instant concern for those on board the
Kursk
. And he would have known that survivors were trained to hold out as long as possible for help to arrive. In the U.S. Navy, sailors are aware they might have to sustain themselves for up to a week. Russian submariners must have about the same time horizon. While a week may seem an inordinate period, especially because many preparations are already in place and set for immediate use, massing for a deep-water
Similar Books
