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Authors: John Keegan
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heavy equipment. Proceeding eastward at 37 miles a day, they headed first towards the northern point of the island of Corsica, steering to make a junction with a separate convoy of 72 ships from Genoa, which they did on 21 May. On 28 May they were joined by another convoy of 22 merchantmen from Ajaccio in Corsica, and on 30 May by the final complement of 56 ships, which had left Civita Vecchia, on the Italian mainland, on the 26th. The combined fleet, now numbering 280 transports, besides its escorting warships, set a course down the eastern side of the island of Sardinia, heading towards Sicily. It cleared the southernmost point of Sardinia on 5 June.
Nelson easily should have been up with it. He was not. The sea had sprung a surprise upon him. His flagship had been dismasted, his scouting frigates scattered, he and his crew had barely escaped from disaster. His ploy of interception had been scuppered, and he could not hope to begin reasserting control of the operational seaspace until he had completed essential repairs and found his consorts.
Nelson had left Gibraltar on 8 May, with his flag in
Vanguard,
74 guns, commanded by Captain Edward Berry, and in company with
Orion,
74 (Captain James Saumarez) and
Alexander,
74 (Captain Alexander Ball). Admiral Lord St. Vincent, commander of the fleet off Spain and his superior, had given him three frigates,
Emerald,
36,
Terpsichore,
32, and
Bonne Citoyenne,
a sloop rather than frigate, of 20 guns. He had also assigned him another ten 74s, a 50-gun ship,
Leander,
and the brig
Mutine,
which were to join later.
Nelson’s departure did not go unnoticed, and
Alexander
was actually struck by a shot from a Spanish shore battery. He arrived nevertheless, apparently undetected, 70 miles south of Toulon on 20 May, “not discovered by the enemy, though close to their ports . . . and exactly in the position for intercepting the Enemy’s ships,” 6 as Captain Berry wrote to his father. Moreover,
Terpsichore
had captured a prize, from which it was learnt that Bonaparte had arrived at Toulon and that fifteen warships were ready for sea, and, though it was not yet known when or whither they would sail, the intelligence gave Nelson and his captains assurance that they were in the right spot, ahead of time.
Then the wind began to freshen.
Vanguard
had sent up its topgallant masts, usually sent down when bad weather threatened. In the early morning of 21 May,
Vanguard,
still under topgallant masts, lost its main topmast, and with it two men, one swept overboard, one killed by falling to the deck. By daybreak, the mizzen topmast had gone as well, the foremast altogether, and the bowsprit was sprung in three places. The ship was almost unmanageable, could be sailed only on a broad reach—at right angles to the wind, which was approaching Force 12 on the Beaufort scale—and was driving towards the rocky west coast of Corsica, on which, unless brought about by some means, she would shortly dash to pieces.
The situation demanded any remedy, however unpromising. The rigging of a spritsail under the creaking bowsprit, an antique device not in naval use for many decades, succeeded in bringing up her head. Very slowly, she was worn round with the wind until she was pointing away from Corsica and so, during the course of the morning, as spars and standing rigging were hacked into the sea, clawed off the lee shore. On 22 May, as the hurricane abated,
Alexander
was able to pass a tow and began to drag
Vanguard
southward towards the west coast of Sardinia. By late afternoon, with the wind moderating, a safe haven between Sardinia and the island of San Piétro was in sight; but the danger of driving ashore still threatened. Nelson signalled an order to
Alexander
to cast off the tow. It was refused and, very gradually,
Vanguard
was brought to anchor on the morning of 23 May. The captain of
Alexander,
Alexander Ball, of whom Nelson had hitherto had a very guarded opinion, became henceforth one of his most
Nelson easily should have been up with it. He was not. The sea had sprung a surprise upon him. His flagship had been dismasted, his scouting frigates scattered, he and his crew had barely escaped from disaster. His ploy of interception had been scuppered, and he could not hope to begin reasserting control of the operational seaspace until he had completed essential repairs and found his consorts.
Nelson had left Gibraltar on 8 May, with his flag in
Vanguard,
74 guns, commanded by Captain Edward Berry, and in company with
Orion,
74 (Captain James Saumarez) and
Alexander,
74 (Captain Alexander Ball). Admiral Lord St. Vincent, commander of the fleet off Spain and his superior, had given him three frigates,
Emerald,
36,
Terpsichore,
32, and
Bonne Citoyenne,
a sloop rather than frigate, of 20 guns. He had also assigned him another ten 74s, a 50-gun ship,
Leander,
and the brig
Mutine,
which were to join later.
Nelson’s departure did not go unnoticed, and
Alexander
was actually struck by a shot from a Spanish shore battery. He arrived nevertheless, apparently undetected, 70 miles south of Toulon on 20 May, “not discovered by the enemy, though close to their ports . . . and exactly in the position for intercepting the Enemy’s ships,” 6 as Captain Berry wrote to his father. Moreover,
Terpsichore
had captured a prize, from which it was learnt that Bonaparte had arrived at Toulon and that fifteen warships were ready for sea, and, though it was not yet known when or whither they would sail, the intelligence gave Nelson and his captains assurance that they were in the right spot, ahead of time.
Then the wind began to freshen.
Vanguard
had sent up its topgallant masts, usually sent down when bad weather threatened. In the early morning of 21 May,
Vanguard,
still under topgallant masts, lost its main topmast, and with it two men, one swept overboard, one killed by falling to the deck. By daybreak, the mizzen topmast had gone as well, the foremast altogether, and the bowsprit was sprung in three places. The ship was almost unmanageable, could be sailed only on a broad reach—at right angles to the wind, which was approaching Force 12 on the Beaufort scale—and was driving towards the rocky west coast of Corsica, on which, unless brought about by some means, she would shortly dash to pieces.
The situation demanded any remedy, however unpromising. The rigging of a spritsail under the creaking bowsprit, an antique device not in naval use for many decades, succeeded in bringing up her head. Very slowly, she was worn round with the wind until she was pointing away from Corsica and so, during the course of the morning, as spars and standing rigging were hacked into the sea, clawed off the lee shore. On 22 May, as the hurricane abated,
Alexander
was able to pass a tow and began to drag
Vanguard
southward towards the west coast of Sardinia. By late afternoon, with the wind moderating, a safe haven between Sardinia and the island of San Piétro was in sight; but the danger of driving ashore still threatened. Nelson signalled an order to
Alexander
to cast off the tow. It was refused and, very gradually,
Vanguard
was brought to anchor on the morning of 23 May. The captain of
Alexander,
Alexander Ball, of whom Nelson had hitherto had a very guarded opinion, became henceforth one of his most
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