Read Online India After Independence: 1947-2000 by Bipan Chandra - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Bipan Chandra
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Ministers which is responsible to parliament. India’s parliamentary form of government bears the closest resemblance to the British system, with the difference of course that India has no hereditary monarchy but an elected President as its symbolic head of state.
The Indian Constitution thus formally confers an enormous range of powers on the President, but these are to be exercised in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet. But the President is by no means a figurehead and the political situation may provide many occasions for, an activist President. This tension, between his formal and real powers has been visible from the time of the first President, Dr Rajendra Prasad. Having serious reservations about the Hindu Code Bill he tried to argue in September 1951 that the President had a greater role to play. Nehru promptly sought the opinion of Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar, the constitutional expert, in Madras and M.C. Setalvad, the Attorney-General. Fortunately for Indian democracy, both the experts were categorical that acceptance of President Rajendra Prasad’s arguments would upset the whole constitutional structure and could lead to the President assuming dictatorial powers. Rajendra Prasad was thus persuaded to exercise a more limited role in keeping with his own earlier hope expressed in the Constituent Assembly debates that ‘the convention under which in England the King acts always on the advice of his Ministers will be established in this country also and the President . . . will become a constitutional President in all matters.’ 12
The danger of a President actually using his powers is least likely when a single party commands a clear majority. But the potential for presidential activism occurs in case of fractured electoral verdicts or splits in the ruling party, leading to unstable coalition governments. The first time this happened was in 1979 when the Janata government led by Morarji Desai fell because of a split in the ruling party. The President, Neelam Sanjiva Reddy used his discretion in refusing Morarji Desai’s request to form a new government, asking Charan Singh to prove his majority by seeking a vote of confidence by a fixed date and consulting other party leaders before accepting the new prime minister, Charan Singh’s advice to dissolve the Lok Sabha. The unstable situation created an opportunity for the President to exercise his discretion.
In recent years, these worries about the President’s role have intensified because of the fact that the last time any party secured a clear majority in the national elections was in 1984-5 when Rajiv Gandhi came to power after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. The elections of 1989, 1991, 1996 and 1998—all created ample opportunities and need for presidential intervention. For example, in March 1998, after the election results showed that when the BJP staked its claim to form the government on the ground that it was the single largest party and had enough support from other parties to win the confidence vote in the Lok Sabha, President Narayanan insisted that Atal Behari Vajpayee, the leader of the BJP, furnish proof in writing that his party did indeed enjoy the support of its allies. This resulted in an embarrassing wait of a few days for the prospective prime minister because one of his critical allies, J. Jayalalitha of the AIADMK (whose desertion finally led to the collapse of the BJP government in April 1999) had many second thoughts and drove hard bargains in well-advertised secret meetings before finally consenting to send the crucial missive extending the AIADMK’s support to the BJP. The President’s role was critical in the entire episode. He could have refused to wait endlessly for the letter of support and invited the leader of the next largest party or group, thus denying the BJP’s claims which were in any case based on a wafer-thin majority. It is evident then that unstable or ambiguous political situations provide room for
The Indian Constitution thus formally confers an enormous range of powers on the President, but these are to be exercised in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet. But the President is by no means a figurehead and the political situation may provide many occasions for, an activist President. This tension, between his formal and real powers has been visible from the time of the first President, Dr Rajendra Prasad. Having serious reservations about the Hindu Code Bill he tried to argue in September 1951 that the President had a greater role to play. Nehru promptly sought the opinion of Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar, the constitutional expert, in Madras and M.C. Setalvad, the Attorney-General. Fortunately for Indian democracy, both the experts were categorical that acceptance of President Rajendra Prasad’s arguments would upset the whole constitutional structure and could lead to the President assuming dictatorial powers. Rajendra Prasad was thus persuaded to exercise a more limited role in keeping with his own earlier hope expressed in the Constituent Assembly debates that ‘the convention under which in England the King acts always on the advice of his Ministers will be established in this country also and the President . . . will become a constitutional President in all matters.’ 12
The danger of a President actually using his powers is least likely when a single party commands a clear majority. But the potential for presidential activism occurs in case of fractured electoral verdicts or splits in the ruling party, leading to unstable coalition governments. The first time this happened was in 1979 when the Janata government led by Morarji Desai fell because of a split in the ruling party. The President, Neelam Sanjiva Reddy used his discretion in refusing Morarji Desai’s request to form a new government, asking Charan Singh to prove his majority by seeking a vote of confidence by a fixed date and consulting other party leaders before accepting the new prime minister, Charan Singh’s advice to dissolve the Lok Sabha. The unstable situation created an opportunity for the President to exercise his discretion.
In recent years, these worries about the President’s role have intensified because of the fact that the last time any party secured a clear majority in the national elections was in 1984-5 when Rajiv Gandhi came to power after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. The elections of 1989, 1991, 1996 and 1998—all created ample opportunities and need for presidential intervention. For example, in March 1998, after the election results showed that when the BJP staked its claim to form the government on the ground that it was the single largest party and had enough support from other parties to win the confidence vote in the Lok Sabha, President Narayanan insisted that Atal Behari Vajpayee, the leader of the BJP, furnish proof in writing that his party did indeed enjoy the support of its allies. This resulted in an embarrassing wait of a few days for the prospective prime minister because one of his critical allies, J. Jayalalitha of the AIADMK (whose desertion finally led to the collapse of the BJP government in April 1999) had many second thoughts and drove hard bargains in well-advertised secret meetings before finally consenting to send the crucial missive extending the AIADMK’s support to the BJP. The President’s role was critical in the entire episode. He could have refused to wait endlessly for the letter of support and invited the leader of the next largest party or group, thus denying the BJP’s claims which were in any case based on a wafer-thin majority. It is evident then that unstable or ambiguous political situations provide room for
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