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Authors: Henrik O. Lunde
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conclusion of peace between the Soviet Union and Finland also saved Chamberlain and Halifax from the precarious position of having to carry out an operation that they believed would remove all possibilities of peace. They no doubt welcomed the news that the Soviet-Finnish conflict had ended, and to remove any possibility that an operation on the scale anticipated could be carried out, they quickly dispatched the two regular divisions (held back for operations in Scandinavia) to France. By reducing the force available for use in Scandinavia to 11 battalions, they hoped to discourage their use. This became a major factor in the debacle following the decision to dispatch troops to Norway.
Churchill’s Mining Plan Approved
Plans for Allied action in Scandinavia, particularly in Norway, continued due to Churchill’s persistence. Information about Allied plans to help the Finns leaked to the press, and their failure to carry them out resulted in a storm of criticism directed at the governments in Britain and France. Daladier’s government fell, and the more aggressive Paul Reynaud replaced him as prime minister. The new French Prime Minister was more congenial to Churchill’s designs. He advocated an aggressive war effort and revisited the question of operations in Scandinavia, including taking control of the Norwegian coast.
Churchill and Reynaud had similar views as to the purpose of operations in Scandinavia, differing only when it came to details. Churchill’s primary goal was to entice the Germans into an area where British naval superiority could bring victories. In the process, the Allies would increase the effectiveness of the blockade, eliminate iron ore shipments to Germany via Norway, and possibly bring Sweden under their sway. This was only different from the views of Reynaud in scope and emphasis. He wanted to send an expedition into Norway in order “to create a new theater of war in which the Germans would use up their men, their materiel, and in particular their air force, and above all, their reserves, especially of petrol.” 28 Chamberlain and Halifax were facing severe criticism in the press and from their colleagues, and it seems they were ready to do anything as long as it looked as if they were doing something.
Reynaud and his colleagues came to London on March 28, 1940 for a meeting of the Supreme War Council. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain finally threw his support behind Churchill’s long-standing proposal to cut Germany’s import of iron ore from Narvik. Reynaud readily agreed, and it was decided to mine Norwegian waters beginning April 5. The participants in the meeting agreed that a good pretext would have to be found to alleviate the adverse reactions such an operation would have in neutral countries, particularly in the United States. It was agreed that diplomatic notes should be sent to Norway and Sweden before the mining. These notes would state that the neutrality policies of the Scandinavian countries gave great comfort and help to Germany, and the Allies could not ignore these facts. In effect, this was tantamount to saying, “Either you are with us or against us.” They would remind the recipients that Hitler was diametrically opposed to the autonomy and rights of small nations, a cause for which the armies of both France and Britain were fighting.
The plan called for delivery of these notes to the Norwegian and Swedish governments on April 1 and 2. The mining operations, code-named Wilfred , were thereupon to proceed without further warning to the Norwegians. These operations were expected to result in German retaliation, and British and French troops were held in readiness for a rapid occupation of Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger (Plan R4 ).
It was hoped that the Norwegians, who were expected to be aware of possible German counter-measures, would not resist the mining, and in fact might welcome the Allied action. The planners were less certain about the Swedish
Churchill’s Mining Plan Approved
Plans for Allied action in Scandinavia, particularly in Norway, continued due to Churchill’s persistence. Information about Allied plans to help the Finns leaked to the press, and their failure to carry them out resulted in a storm of criticism directed at the governments in Britain and France. Daladier’s government fell, and the more aggressive Paul Reynaud replaced him as prime minister. The new French Prime Minister was more congenial to Churchill’s designs. He advocated an aggressive war effort and revisited the question of operations in Scandinavia, including taking control of the Norwegian coast.
Churchill and Reynaud had similar views as to the purpose of operations in Scandinavia, differing only when it came to details. Churchill’s primary goal was to entice the Germans into an area where British naval superiority could bring victories. In the process, the Allies would increase the effectiveness of the blockade, eliminate iron ore shipments to Germany via Norway, and possibly bring Sweden under their sway. This was only different from the views of Reynaud in scope and emphasis. He wanted to send an expedition into Norway in order “to create a new theater of war in which the Germans would use up their men, their materiel, and in particular their air force, and above all, their reserves, especially of petrol.” 28 Chamberlain and Halifax were facing severe criticism in the press and from their colleagues, and it seems they were ready to do anything as long as it looked as if they were doing something.
Reynaud and his colleagues came to London on March 28, 1940 for a meeting of the Supreme War Council. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain finally threw his support behind Churchill’s long-standing proposal to cut Germany’s import of iron ore from Narvik. Reynaud readily agreed, and it was decided to mine Norwegian waters beginning April 5. The participants in the meeting agreed that a good pretext would have to be found to alleviate the adverse reactions such an operation would have in neutral countries, particularly in the United States. It was agreed that diplomatic notes should be sent to Norway and Sweden before the mining. These notes would state that the neutrality policies of the Scandinavian countries gave great comfort and help to Germany, and the Allies could not ignore these facts. In effect, this was tantamount to saying, “Either you are with us or against us.” They would remind the recipients that Hitler was diametrically opposed to the autonomy and rights of small nations, a cause for which the armies of both France and Britain were fighting.
The plan called for delivery of these notes to the Norwegian and Swedish governments on April 1 and 2. The mining operations, code-named Wilfred , were thereupon to proceed without further warning to the Norwegians. These operations were expected to result in German retaliation, and British and French troops were held in readiness for a rapid occupation of Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger (Plan R4 ).
It was hoped that the Norwegians, who were expected to be aware of possible German counter-measures, would not resist the mining, and in fact might welcome the Allied action. The planners were less certain about the Swedish
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