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‘unplugged hole’ that cannot be explained away by the fear of Hitler’s allergy to counter-argument respecting the Me 262 in the fast bomber role. Certainly if there had been an energetic resistance hats would have rolled if not heads. Yet twelve months later when the ineffective officers’ revolt reported by Steinhoff and Galland took place it went unpunished. The bull must occasionally be taken by the horns and the admirable operations of Jagdverband 44 which followed the said ‘revolt’ were by far more dangerous to health than tackling Hitler respectfully about the Me 262.
    The real guilty party was Goering. He had fallen from grace and lacked the courage to chance Hitler’s now undisguised disfavour. He who barely eight months previously had refused Milch the use of fighter aircraft was now not only silent but – according to Irving – actually approved a variation of the jet-fighter project which meant a setback of months. Galland also kept a still tongue although at least he and his office were not inactive behind the scenes.
    The Arado aircraft firm was turning out the Ar 234, a jet bomber not far behind the Me 262 in development. This would have been the right machine for Hitler’s bomber idea, but the pressures of time, difficulties in obtaining materials and fuel, crew training, the deteriorating situations on the various fronts and – as before – Hitler’s sensibilities, all combined to ensure that nothing came of it. In the event, in a telex dated 5 December 1943, Hitler ordered the Ar 234 to be used in the fast reconnaissance role for which it would be at operational readiness by the autumn of 1944. It was also turned out as a bomber designated Ar 234-B2, but this version did not make its appearance until the end of 1944. By the war’s end only about 200 Ar 234 jets had been built and used operationally. Many went to training units, others to bomber squadron KG76 and some were probably used as stop-gaps in the fighter ranks.
    Hearing Messerschmitt’s reply to Hitler’s question regarding the possibility of making the Me 262 into the Blitzbomber, Oberst Petersen of the Rechlin Test Centre remarked in an undertone to his neighbour, ‘That’s torn it!’, and he was proved right.
    Hitler, whom nobody in his entourage dared contradict, remained adamant that the Me 262 must be used as a fast bomber. Whatever difficulties and objections there might be did not interest him. He had, after all, solved more awkward problems. Aside from the weapons of reprisal, he had nothing more to add on the subject of the appalling and ever increasing bombardment of Germany’s cities and industry.
    Thousands of tons of explosives rained down on Germany day and night. In the week when German fighters shot down 300 enemy bombers, the enemy took note of this fact and exacted revenge by destroying 700 Me 109s on the production line, together with large areas of the various assembly works. But the Me 262, which as the only superfast fighter in the world could have brought to a halt these lethal depredations, was not available. There was evidence that the Allies could not continue to operate over Reich air space at a 10 per cent loss rate in aircraft per raid. The first delivery of mass-produced Me 262 fighters was scheduled for May 1944. If this date had been kept, it would not have brought the turning of the tide overnight but it would – as would later be proved – have put a large dent in the air supremacy which the Allies enjoyed from the summer of 1944.
    In this connection mention must be made of the Me 163 rocket fighter. This most modern fighter could also have been operational earlier if its final development stage to operational readiness had been given a higher priority from the beginning. Because of its very limited range the Me 163 escaped consideration for the Blitzbomber role. The Walter rocket engine had tanks for two tonnes of fuel which lasted five minutes. The aircraft could reach ten kilometres