Read Online Harvard Rules by Richard Bradley - Free Book Online Page A
Authors: Richard Bradley
Ads: Link
âmeant eighteen-hour days and quite vicious attacks, and it was less than totally settling to learn that in a real sense, my human capital was peso-denominated,â Summers quipped. After a lecture Summers gave at the Kennedy School in April 2002, moderator Graham Allison asked him if he could speak âfor a couple of minutesâ about the Mexico bailout. Almost twenty minutes later, Summers finished his answer.
There is one part of the story that Summers doesnât tell, however. The success of the Treasury loan package would not be assured for several months, and more than once during that time it appeared that the U.S. initiative wasnât going to stop Mexicoâs slide. In late February, just a few days after the deal had been signed, things looked so grim that Summers walked into Rubinâs office near midnight and volunteered to resign. âHe was taking the matter much too personally,â Rubin later said, declining the offer. It was a sign of how serious Summers considered the situationâand how expansive he saw his own role in it.
The process of rescuing Mexico taught Summers another lesson: that some matters were too important to be democratically decided. âThe Marshall Plan,â he would say, âwas never focus-grouped.â Heâd seen how Republican leaders had originally supported the Mexico deal in private, then held their fingers to the wind and demagogued it in public. Congress lacked the guts to pass such an unpopular bill. And why was it unpopular? Because most Americans simply didnât know enough about international economics to have an informed opinion. If you just put smart men like him, Rubin, and Greenspan in a room and left them alone, they could work things out. They could save nations.
It was hard for Summers to mask his impatience with the imperfections of politics and the legislative process. He was still prone to using language that may have been effective in the classroom but was unusually provocative in the offices and corridors of Washington. He also had an unfortunate habit of stating how he really felt. During a 1997 debate over cutting the federal tax on inheritances, Summers remarked that âwhen it comes to the estate tax, there is no case other than selfishness.â That didnât sit well with Republicans, who argued that the estate tax punished families trying to pass on farms and small businesses to their children. âLarryâs brain was like a tank powered by a Lotus engine,â recalled administration colleague Strobe Talbott. âIt purred as it rolled over anything in its way.â
It didnât help that Republicans already disliked Summers because of his role in short-circuiting Congress in the Mexico crisis. In the aftermath of that, some GOP members of Congress pushed for Summersâ resignation. They didnât get it, and in August, Rubin nominated Summers to be deputy treasury secretary, a position confirmed by the Senate. Twenty-one senators voted against Summers, an unusually large number for what would normally be a routine vote.
âI believe in trying to find the essence of issues, to probe different positions in a very strong way, to discover the right approach,â Summers explained. âIâm sorry when that way of thinking gives offense.â Or, as his mother would tell a reporter, âHe wasnât born to the political arena, where you are always very aware of what you are saying. I think that what many people are seeing is an intellectual form of exploration and underneath is a very kind heart.â But even when he tried to say the right things, it was clear that Summers harbored a deep skepticism of, and maybe even a hint of contempt for, the legislative process.
He could also be a difficult boss. âIf youâre in a meeting, whatever you say, he will make you feel like youâre an idiot,â said one ex-Treasury aide who worked for both Summers and Rubin.
There is one part of the story that Summers doesnât tell, however. The success of the Treasury loan package would not be assured for several months, and more than once during that time it appeared that the U.S. initiative wasnât going to stop Mexicoâs slide. In late February, just a few days after the deal had been signed, things looked so grim that Summers walked into Rubinâs office near midnight and volunteered to resign. âHe was taking the matter much too personally,â Rubin later said, declining the offer. It was a sign of how serious Summers considered the situationâand how expansive he saw his own role in it.
The process of rescuing Mexico taught Summers another lesson: that some matters were too important to be democratically decided. âThe Marshall Plan,â he would say, âwas never focus-grouped.â Heâd seen how Republican leaders had originally supported the Mexico deal in private, then held their fingers to the wind and demagogued it in public. Congress lacked the guts to pass such an unpopular bill. And why was it unpopular? Because most Americans simply didnât know enough about international economics to have an informed opinion. If you just put smart men like him, Rubin, and Greenspan in a room and left them alone, they could work things out. They could save nations.
It was hard for Summers to mask his impatience with the imperfections of politics and the legislative process. He was still prone to using language that may have been effective in the classroom but was unusually provocative in the offices and corridors of Washington. He also had an unfortunate habit of stating how he really felt. During a 1997 debate over cutting the federal tax on inheritances, Summers remarked that âwhen it comes to the estate tax, there is no case other than selfishness.â That didnât sit well with Republicans, who argued that the estate tax punished families trying to pass on farms and small businesses to their children. âLarryâs brain was like a tank powered by a Lotus engine,â recalled administration colleague Strobe Talbott. âIt purred as it rolled over anything in its way.â
It didnât help that Republicans already disliked Summers because of his role in short-circuiting Congress in the Mexico crisis. In the aftermath of that, some GOP members of Congress pushed for Summersâ resignation. They didnât get it, and in August, Rubin nominated Summers to be deputy treasury secretary, a position confirmed by the Senate. Twenty-one senators voted against Summers, an unusually large number for what would normally be a routine vote.
âI believe in trying to find the essence of issues, to probe different positions in a very strong way, to discover the right approach,â Summers explained. âIâm sorry when that way of thinking gives offense.â Or, as his mother would tell a reporter, âHe wasnât born to the political arena, where you are always very aware of what you are saying. I think that what many people are seeing is an intellectual form of exploration and underneath is a very kind heart.â But even when he tried to say the right things, it was clear that Summers harbored a deep skepticism of, and maybe even a hint of contempt for, the legislative process.
He could also be a difficult boss. âIf youâre in a meeting, whatever you say, he will make you feel like youâre an idiot,â said one ex-Treasury aide who worked for both Summers and Rubin.
Similar Books
