the theory of relativity, began the second great revolution. Just as Newton was instrumental in causing the transition from organismic to mechanistic physics, so Einstein followed with the change from the mechanistic to what is sometimes called the mathematical description of nature.
In order to obtain a good understanding of Einstein’s work and a comprehension of the paradoxical fate of his theories, it is necessary to appreciate the great emotional disturbances and the interference of political, religious, and social forces that have accompanied the revolutions in the philosophical conceptions of nature. Just as the Roman Inquisition characterized and condemned the investigations of Copernicus and Galileo as “philosophically false” because they did not fit into its conception of nature, many philosophers and physicists all over the world rejected Einstein’s theory of relativity since they could not understand it from their mechanistic point of view. In both cases the reason for the condemnation was not a difference of opinion in the judgment of observations, but the fact that the new theory did not employ the analogies required by the traditional philosophy.
It is certainly true that this rigid insistence on the retention of a specific explanatory analogy has in some cases discouraged the discovery of new laws that would account for newly discovered facts. But it would be a great historical injustice to maintain that this conservatism has always been harmful to the progress of science. The application of a specific conception was an important instrument for the unification of the various branches of science. According to the organismic view, there was no real gap between animate and inanimate nature; both were subject to the same laws. The same situation existed in the mechanistic view, in which living organisms were described in terms of mechanics. Furthermore, the thorough application of an analogy frequently demanded a formal simplification, since it favored theories that derived all experimental evidence from a few simple principles.
Since all of us absorbed the mechanistic conception of nature in our training in school, it has become so familiar to us that we regard it as a triviality. When a theory seems trivial, however, we no longer understand its salient point. Consequently,in order to comprehend the great revolutionary significance that this theory possessed when it first appeared, we must try to imagine ourselves in that period. We shall see that mechanistic science in its early stages appeared as incomprehensible and paradoxical to many people as Einstein’s theory does today.
2.
Organismic Physics of the Middle Ages
When we observe a person’s action we find that he is sometimes understandable and at other times incomprehensible. When we see a man suddenly dashing off in a particular direction, it appears strange at first, but when we learn that in that direction gold coins are being distributed gratis, his action becomes understandable. We cannot understand his action until we know his purpose. Exactly the same is true of animal behavior. When a hare rushes off in a hurry, we understand this action if we know that there is a dog after it. The purpose of any motion is to reach a point that is somehow better adapted than the point from which it set out.
Just as different kinds of behavior are exhibited by various organisms depending on their nature, so “organismic science” interpreted the movements executed by inanimate objects. The falling of a stone and the rising of flame may be interpreted as follows: Just as a mouse has its hole in the ground while an eagle nests on a mountain crag, so a stone has its proper place on the earth while a flame has its up above on one of the spheres that revolve around the earth. Each body has its natural position, where it ought to be in accordance with its nature. If a body is removed from this position, it executes a violent motion and seeks to return
In order to obtain a good understanding of Einstein’s work and a comprehension of the paradoxical fate of his theories, it is necessary to appreciate the great emotional disturbances and the interference of political, religious, and social forces that have accompanied the revolutions in the philosophical conceptions of nature. Just as the Roman Inquisition characterized and condemned the investigations of Copernicus and Galileo as “philosophically false” because they did not fit into its conception of nature, many philosophers and physicists all over the world rejected Einstein’s theory of relativity since they could not understand it from their mechanistic point of view. In both cases the reason for the condemnation was not a difference of opinion in the judgment of observations, but the fact that the new theory did not employ the analogies required by the traditional philosophy.
It is certainly true that this rigid insistence on the retention of a specific explanatory analogy has in some cases discouraged the discovery of new laws that would account for newly discovered facts. But it would be a great historical injustice to maintain that this conservatism has always been harmful to the progress of science. The application of a specific conception was an important instrument for the unification of the various branches of science. According to the organismic view, there was no real gap between animate and inanimate nature; both were subject to the same laws. The same situation existed in the mechanistic view, in which living organisms were described in terms of mechanics. Furthermore, the thorough application of an analogy frequently demanded a formal simplification, since it favored theories that derived all experimental evidence from a few simple principles.
Since all of us absorbed the mechanistic conception of nature in our training in school, it has become so familiar to us that we regard it as a triviality. When a theory seems trivial, however, we no longer understand its salient point. Consequently,in order to comprehend the great revolutionary significance that this theory possessed when it first appeared, we must try to imagine ourselves in that period. We shall see that mechanistic science in its early stages appeared as incomprehensible and paradoxical to many people as Einstein’s theory does today.
2.
Organismic Physics of the Middle Ages
When we observe a person’s action we find that he is sometimes understandable and at other times incomprehensible. When we see a man suddenly dashing off in a particular direction, it appears strange at first, but when we learn that in that direction gold coins are being distributed gratis, his action becomes understandable. We cannot understand his action until we know his purpose. Exactly the same is true of animal behavior. When a hare rushes off in a hurry, we understand this action if we know that there is a dog after it. The purpose of any motion is to reach a point that is somehow better adapted than the point from which it set out.
Just as different kinds of behavior are exhibited by various organisms depending on their nature, so “organismic science” interpreted the movements executed by inanimate objects. The falling of a stone and the rising of flame may be interpreted as follows: Just as a mouse has its hole in the ground while an eagle nests on a mountain crag, so a stone has its proper place on the earth while a flame has its up above on one of the spheres that revolve around the earth. Each body has its natural position, where it ought to be in accordance with its nature. If a body is removed from this position, it executes a violent motion and seeks to return
Similar Books
