outside Tallinn. But Yakovlev was a curious choice of case officer for a source of Simmâs importance. He appears to have broken several cardinal rules of Soviet spycraft. The cost of establishing a fully fledged illegal in a NATO country is considerable. Creating an identity for Antonio involved obtaining the birth certificate from Brazil, using that to obtain a Portuguese passport, and then establishing a convincing pattern of activity that would take him to the Baltic states when necessary. In the austere world of the KGB, his only task would have been to run Simm: meeting him in carefully chosen locations either with proper clandestine preparation, or openly in a way that fitted both menâs natural pattern of activity.
But the Russian was clearly being used for other purposes too. A good illustration of his approach comes from Ivar Tallo, a distinguished Estonian official who has helped make the country a world leader in âe-governmentâ â putting public administration online. Mr Tallo recalls meeting Antonio rather reluctantly in 2001 , as a favour to a friend and colleague in high office. That was nothing unusual: foreign visitors were flooding into the Baltic states as the reborn countriesâ economic and political importance grew. Senior officials could not possibly meet them all, and a persistent Portuguese consultant would be quite likely to be farmed out to someone less important. At any rate, Mr Tallo chose an expensive Italian restaurant in Tallinn, on the reasonable assumption that he would at least get a decent meal in exchange for his time. Two more meetings followed. Antonio quizzed Mr Tallo on Estoniaâs politics and economics, showing no particular interest in his specialty of e-government or associated questions of cyber-security. At the third meeting he suggested formalising the cooperation on a commercial basis. He suggested that Mr Tallo set up a company offering political and economic forecasts, for which his clients in Portugal would be prepared to pay handsomely; to underline the point he pressed an envelope of cash on Mr Tallo as an advance payment. The Estonian politely declined. He did not want to be obligated to the persistent Portuguese and found the offer of money slightly disconcerting. Truthfully, he explained that he was simply too busy to take up the offer. His interest was in e-government, not business information. Antonio never contacted him again.
The approach is straight out of an intelligence playbook. First hook the fish, then reel him in. Money creates a relationship, then an obligation. At some point the material asked for becomes less anodyne and more sensitive. Before the victim is fully aware of what has happened, he is enmeshed. Then comes the offer of still more money for really interesting information, and perhaps the threat of exposure in the case of non-cooperation. Mr Tallo was never close to that danger, and reported the encounter to the Estonian authorities as soon as news of the spyâs real identity broke. Fatefully, Antonio tried a similar approach with a senior Lithuanian public figure a few years later, arousing the interest of that countryâs then formidable counter-intelligence service. bq It remains unclear where else he tried his persuasive tactics, and with what result. As late as 2010 , Latviaâs spycatchers were still following up leads dating from his regular trips to Riga. Yet Antonio was failing in his primary duty: to run Russiaâs key Estonian source securely and efficiently. Simm instantly distrusted his new case officer, referring to him as a soplyak â a derogatory Russian word for an incompetent beginner that translates roughly as âsnotnoseâ or âwet behind the earsâ.
After a botched first meeting with Simm in Cyprus, distrust turned to loathing. Simm says his case officer was âlightweight and arrogantâ: snooty, rude and worst of all careless. The Russian was greedy too.
But the Russian was clearly being used for other purposes too. A good illustration of his approach comes from Ivar Tallo, a distinguished Estonian official who has helped make the country a world leader in âe-governmentâ â putting public administration online. Mr Tallo recalls meeting Antonio rather reluctantly in 2001 , as a favour to a friend and colleague in high office. That was nothing unusual: foreign visitors were flooding into the Baltic states as the reborn countriesâ economic and political importance grew. Senior officials could not possibly meet them all, and a persistent Portuguese consultant would be quite likely to be farmed out to someone less important. At any rate, Mr Tallo chose an expensive Italian restaurant in Tallinn, on the reasonable assumption that he would at least get a decent meal in exchange for his time. Two more meetings followed. Antonio quizzed Mr Tallo on Estoniaâs politics and economics, showing no particular interest in his specialty of e-government or associated questions of cyber-security. At the third meeting he suggested formalising the cooperation on a commercial basis. He suggested that Mr Tallo set up a company offering political and economic forecasts, for which his clients in Portugal would be prepared to pay handsomely; to underline the point he pressed an envelope of cash on Mr Tallo as an advance payment. The Estonian politely declined. He did not want to be obligated to the persistent Portuguese and found the offer of money slightly disconcerting. Truthfully, he explained that he was simply too busy to take up the offer. His interest was in e-government, not business information. Antonio never contacted him again.
The approach is straight out of an intelligence playbook. First hook the fish, then reel him in. Money creates a relationship, then an obligation. At some point the material asked for becomes less anodyne and more sensitive. Before the victim is fully aware of what has happened, he is enmeshed. Then comes the offer of still more money for really interesting information, and perhaps the threat of exposure in the case of non-cooperation. Mr Tallo was never close to that danger, and reported the encounter to the Estonian authorities as soon as news of the spyâs real identity broke. Fatefully, Antonio tried a similar approach with a senior Lithuanian public figure a few years later, arousing the interest of that countryâs then formidable counter-intelligence service. bq It remains unclear where else he tried his persuasive tactics, and with what result. As late as 2010 , Latviaâs spycatchers were still following up leads dating from his regular trips to Riga. Yet Antonio was failing in his primary duty: to run Russiaâs key Estonian source securely and efficiently. Simm instantly distrusted his new case officer, referring to him as a soplyak â a derogatory Russian word for an incompetent beginner that translates roughly as âsnotnoseâ or âwet behind the earsâ.
After a botched first meeting with Simm in Cyprus, distrust turned to loathing. Simm says his case officer was âlightweight and arrogantâ: snooty, rude and worst of all careless. The Russian was greedy too.
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