fulfilment of conditionality and the disbursement rate of aid funds’, proving once again that though a central part of many aid agreements, conditionalities did not seem to matter much in practice.
Aid success in good policy environments
Faced with mounting evidence that aid has not worked, aid proponents have also argued that aid would work, and did work, when placed in good policy environments, i.e. countries with sound fiscal, monetary and trade policies. In other words, aid would do its best, when a country was in essentially good working order. This argument was formalized in a seminal paper published by World Bank economists Burnside and Dollar in 2000. (Quite why a country in working order would need aid, or not seek other better, more transparent forms of financing itself, remains a mystery.)
Donors soon latched onto the Burnside–Dollar result and were quick to put the findings into practice. In 2004, for example, the US government launched its US$5 billion Millennium Challenge Corporation aid campaign motivated by the idea that ‘economic development assistance can be successful only if it is linked to sound policies in developing countries’. 4 In later empirical work, the Burnside–Dollar result failed to stand up to scrutiny, and it soon lost its allure. It was not long before the wider economic community concluded that the Burnside–Dollar findings were tenuous and certainly not robust; perhaps eventually coming to the obvious conclusion that countries with good policies – like Botswana – would tend to make progress unassisted, and that a key point of aid is to help countries with bad ones. But even setting aside empirical analysis, there are, as discussed later, valid concerns that, far from making any improvement, aid could make a good policy environment bad, and a bad policy environment worse.
On the subject of good policy environments, aid supporters are convinced that aid works when it targets democracy, because only a democratic environment can jump-start economic growth. From a Western perspective, democracy promises the lot.
There are, in fact, good reasons for believing that democracy is a leading determinant of economic growth, as almost invariably the body politic bleeds into economics. Liberal democracy(and the political freedoms it bestows) protects property rights, ensures checks and balances, defends a free press and guards contracts. Political scientists such as Douglass North have long asserted democracy’s essential links with a just and enforceable legal framework.
Democracy, the argument goes, gives a greater percentage of the population access to the political decision-making process, and this in turn ensures contract enforcement through an independent judiciary. Not only will democracy protect you, but it will also help you better yourself. Democracy promises that businesses, however small, will be protected under the democratic rule of law. Democracy also offers the poor and disadvantaged the opportunity to redress any unfair distribution via the state.
It is after all under democratic governments, the American economist and social scientist Mancur Olson posited, that the protection of property rights and the security of contracts, crucial for stimulating economic activity, were more likely. In essence, democracy engenders a peace dividend, introduces a form of political stability that makes it a precursor for economic growth. In Olson’s world, democratic regimes engage in activities that assist private production in two ways: either by maintaining a framework (regulatory, legal, etc.) for private activity or by directly supplying inputs which are not efficiently delivered by the market (for example, a road connecting a small remote village to a larger trading town). By their very nature, democracies have an incentive to provide public goods which benefit each and everyone, and wealth creation is more likely under democratic regimes than non-democracies, such as, say,
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