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consensus on which the modern Irish state has been built. It represented an asser­tion of sovereignty in terms more acceptable to nationalists than those of the Statute of Westminster six years earlier. That statute had secured sovereign independence for the dominions, including the Irish state. In international law this independence clearly included the right to remain neutral in a conflict involving Great Britain. But many British politicians cherished the illusion that the member states of the common­wealth, while independent, must necessarily join with Britain in any major war in which she was engaged – relying in some cases upon the abstract concept of the indivisibility of the crown.
    But for many Irish people, and particularly for de Valera himself, the right to remain neutral, and the assertion of that right, was the ultimate test of sovereignty and independence. A practical obstacle to the exercise of this right was the continued occupation and use of certain port faci­lities in the Irish state by British forces under the terms of the Treaty. In 1938, as part of the settlement that ended the Economic War, de Valera negotiated the return of these facilities and the departure of British for­ces, and despite discussion of a possible defence pact during these nego­tiations, eventually this was secured without any commitment to make these bases available again in time of war.
    This obstacle to neutrality having been removed, de Valera, by that time disillusioned by the collapse of collective security under the League of Nations, first in the case of Manchuria and later in the case of Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia, declared Irish neutrality, and maintained formal neutrality throughout the war – while at the same time secretly working closely with the British authorities.
    This policy commanded the full support of the political opposition, with a single outstanding exception. James Dillon, who in 1942 retired from the position of deputy leader of the principal opposition party, Fine Gael, and became an independent member of the Dáil on an issue which he saw as one between good and evil – but significantly only after the USA had joined the war.
    While the assertion of sovereignty was the primary motivation of neutrality it would be wrong to suggest that it was the sole consideration for de Valera, or indeed that it played any part in the ready acceptance of this policy by his political opponents. Amongst all political parties there was, I believe, the further, powerful, albeit for obvious reasons un­spoken, consideration that to have entered voluntarily into the conflict on the allied side within sixteen years of the end of a civil war would have created the danger of a revival of that bitter conflict. This perceived danger had been increased by the IRA’s immediate pre-war decision to ‘declare war’ on Britain and to set off bombs in British cities. As was very clear in Spain during the closing period of Franco’s rule, a people who have experienced a civil war will go to immense lengths to avoid a re­currence of it.
    The significance of this factor in securing all party support for neut­rality, has, I believe, been under-estimated by historians because during the war it was never explicitly stated by any politician of any party – for obvious reasons. But it was, I believe, subsequently mentioned in retro­spective interviews by two senior Fianna Fáil politicians, Seán Lemass and Seán McEntee, and I believe that explains my own father’s support for neutrality despite his deep commitment to the allied cause.
    Of course de Valera also used another argument for neutrality; vis., that so long as Ireland remained politically divided, with part of the is­land under British sovereignty, the Irish state should not engage in hos­tilities as an ally of Britain. The employment of this argument, largely per­haps for tactical reasons at the