was not a mere matter of military judgment: it was the critical moment in the resurrection of France. The overwhelming concern of De Gaulle’s staff was to ensure the liberation of the largest possible area of their country as rapidly as possible. They were deeply dismayed by the great Allied transport bombing programme. The lawyer Marcel Brault, alias Jérôme, who came to London from theRhône Valley early in 1944 and played a leading role in persuading the Prime Minister to reinforce the Resistance, wrote in February:
The French population has become very discouraged by the postponement of the invasion which had been expected last autumn, by the Vichy propaganda which has called attention to the terrorism in the Resistance groups, and finally by the slow progress of the Allied armies in Italy. It could become absolutely apathetic if aerial bombing is intensified without a clear indication of its necessity.
Colonel Passy was among the pessimists about the real prospects of a mass uprising in France on D-Day. But many others among De Gaulle’s men had a spectacular vision of open insurrection in southern and central France, where the Germans were thinly spread and great tracts of broken country lent themselves readily to guerilla warfare. There was discussion of possible Resistance ‘redoubts’ in which great masses of maquisards might assemble, and to which they might withdraw if they were driven back on to the defensive by German counter-attacks. Although all these misconceived notions were finally quashed, one of the most serious errors of omission in the weeks before D-Day was that résistants were not discouraged with nearly sufficient force from concentrating in arms when the Action Messages came. Some groups were even left by London and Algiers with a clear idea that they were expected to gather en masse . This confusion in high places was caused by doubt about just what would happen when the Action Messages were sent. It was indirectly responsible for the tragedies of the Vercors, the Glières and several lesser slaughters inflicted upon résistants .
On 7 May 1944 Churchill cabled President Roosevelt:
Massigli handed me this morning a memorandum concerning Allied bombardments of French targets, expressing the serious psychological effect they are having on the French Resistance groups when the loss of human life obtained does not seem tocorrespond with the results obtained, notably in the case of stations and factories in occupied districts. It is suggested that sabotage operations would achieve a better result without risk of life.
The President disagreed, and the Allied military commanders almost unanimously followed him. A senior British staff officer scribbled upon the Free French blueprint for Resistance and D-Day:
This plan gives the impression that the object of Overlord is to support the operations of the French Resistance, eg by drawing off enemy armour from freed zones, and not the other way round . . .
The French at all times keep in mind the fact that they have the economy of their country to maintain during the period of military operations and after the war. They tend to put this consideration before military requirements.
The Allied air assault on the French transport system continued until and after D-Day on the ‘worst case’ assumption, that Resistance could contribute nothing to the dislocation of the communications. Between 9 February and 6 June 75,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 21,949 sorties by Bomber Command and the USAAF. The overwhelming consensus at SHAEF was that, when Resistance mobilized, its men should remain in small groups, and at all costs avoid concentrating in large bodies that invited German attack. However, the Allied commanders were obviously content to approve any Resistance plan that did not increase their commitment, and promised to cause difficulty to the Germans. The Free French had devoted enormous labour to compiling detailed plans for the destruction of
The French population has become very discouraged by the postponement of the invasion which had been expected last autumn, by the Vichy propaganda which has called attention to the terrorism in the Resistance groups, and finally by the slow progress of the Allied armies in Italy. It could become absolutely apathetic if aerial bombing is intensified without a clear indication of its necessity.
Colonel Passy was among the pessimists about the real prospects of a mass uprising in France on D-Day. But many others among De Gaulle’s men had a spectacular vision of open insurrection in southern and central France, where the Germans were thinly spread and great tracts of broken country lent themselves readily to guerilla warfare. There was discussion of possible Resistance ‘redoubts’ in which great masses of maquisards might assemble, and to which they might withdraw if they were driven back on to the defensive by German counter-attacks. Although all these misconceived notions were finally quashed, one of the most serious errors of omission in the weeks before D-Day was that résistants were not discouraged with nearly sufficient force from concentrating in arms when the Action Messages came. Some groups were even left by London and Algiers with a clear idea that they were expected to gather en masse . This confusion in high places was caused by doubt about just what would happen when the Action Messages were sent. It was indirectly responsible for the tragedies of the Vercors, the Glières and several lesser slaughters inflicted upon résistants .
On 7 May 1944 Churchill cabled President Roosevelt:
Massigli handed me this morning a memorandum concerning Allied bombardments of French targets, expressing the serious psychological effect they are having on the French Resistance groups when the loss of human life obtained does not seem tocorrespond with the results obtained, notably in the case of stations and factories in occupied districts. It is suggested that sabotage operations would achieve a better result without risk of life.
The President disagreed, and the Allied military commanders almost unanimously followed him. A senior British staff officer scribbled upon the Free French blueprint for Resistance and D-Day:
This plan gives the impression that the object of Overlord is to support the operations of the French Resistance, eg by drawing off enemy armour from freed zones, and not the other way round . . .
The French at all times keep in mind the fact that they have the economy of their country to maintain during the period of military operations and after the war. They tend to put this consideration before military requirements.
The Allied air assault on the French transport system continued until and after D-Day on the ‘worst case’ assumption, that Resistance could contribute nothing to the dislocation of the communications. Between 9 February and 6 June 75,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 21,949 sorties by Bomber Command and the USAAF. The overwhelming consensus at SHAEF was that, when Resistance mobilized, its men should remain in small groups, and at all costs avoid concentrating in large bodies that invited German attack. However, the Allied commanders were obviously content to approve any Resistance plan that did not increase their commitment, and promised to cause difficulty to the Germans. The Free French had devoted enormous labour to compiling detailed plans for the destruction of
Similar Books
