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Authors: Winston S. Churchill
Tags: History, Western, World War II, Military, British, War, Non-Fiction, Europe, Political Science, Great Britain
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we should certainly do what we can to further this move. If there were a revolution in Italy and an Armistice Government came into power, it is at least arguable that the German interests would be as well served by standing on the Brenner as by undertaking the detailed defence of Italy against the wishes of its people, and possibly of a provisional Government.
3. When a nation is thoroughly beaten in war, it does all sorts of things which no one would imagine beforehand. The sudden, sullen, universal, simultaneous way in which Bulgaria—Government, Army, and people alike—cut out in 1918 remains in my memory. Without caring to make any arrangements for their future or for their safety, the troops simply marched out of the lines and dispersed to their homes, and King Ferdinand fled. A Government headed by a peasant leader remained to await the judgment of the victors.
4. Therefore, I would not rule out the possibilities of a sudden peace demand being made by Italy, and I agree with the United States policy of trying to separate the Italian people from their Government. The fall of Mussolini, even though precautions may have been taken against it beforehand, might well have a decisive effect upon Italian opinion. The Fascist chapter would be closed. One tale would be finished and another would begin. I consider it would be well to drop leaflets over all Italian towns that are bombed, on the theme, “One man alone is the cause of your sufferings—Mussolini.”
5. It is to be observed that we are under no obligations to offer any terms to the vanquished, should they sue for them. That decision must be taken when and if we are offered their surrender, and in the meanwhile we certainly ought not to make promises, as some of the American propaganda leaflets have seemed to do.
The news from Rome now raised these issues, and prompted me to telegraph to the President:
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
26 July 43
Changes announced in Italy probably portend peace proposals. Let us consult together so as to take joint action. The present stage may only be transition. But anyhow Hitler will feel very lonely when Mussolini is down and out. No one can be quite sure this may not go further.
The President’s message to me crossed this telegram:
President Roosevelt to Prime Minister
26 July 43
By coincidence I was again at Shangri La this afternoon when the news from Rome came, but this time it seems to be true. If any overtures come we must be certain of the use of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula , 2 as well as use of airfields of all kinds. It is my thought that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender, followed by good treatment of the Italian populace. But I think also that the Head Devil should be surrendered, together with his chief partners in crime. In no event should our officers in the field fix on any general terms without your approval and mine. Let me have your thoughts.
* * * * *
The results of our joint action would dominate the future course of the war. I spent part of the same day in setting down on paper my reactions to the Italian drama. In the afternoon the War Cabinet met to discuss the new situation, and to consider the draft which I had composed. That evening I sent a copy to the President for his comments.
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
26 July 43
I send you my thoughts in the form in which I submitted them to the War Cabinet, obtaining their full approval.
2. I don’t think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any non-Fascist Government, even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone, I would deal with any non-Fascist Italian Government which can deliver the goods. The goods are set out in my memo herewith. My colleagues also agreed with this.
THOUGHTS ON THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI
B Y THE P RIME M INISTER
It seems highly
3. When a nation is thoroughly beaten in war, it does all sorts of things which no one would imagine beforehand. The sudden, sullen, universal, simultaneous way in which Bulgaria—Government, Army, and people alike—cut out in 1918 remains in my memory. Without caring to make any arrangements for their future or for their safety, the troops simply marched out of the lines and dispersed to their homes, and King Ferdinand fled. A Government headed by a peasant leader remained to await the judgment of the victors.
4. Therefore, I would not rule out the possibilities of a sudden peace demand being made by Italy, and I agree with the United States policy of trying to separate the Italian people from their Government. The fall of Mussolini, even though precautions may have been taken against it beforehand, might well have a decisive effect upon Italian opinion. The Fascist chapter would be closed. One tale would be finished and another would begin. I consider it would be well to drop leaflets over all Italian towns that are bombed, on the theme, “One man alone is the cause of your sufferings—Mussolini.”
5. It is to be observed that we are under no obligations to offer any terms to the vanquished, should they sue for them. That decision must be taken when and if we are offered their surrender, and in the meanwhile we certainly ought not to make promises, as some of the American propaganda leaflets have seemed to do.
The news from Rome now raised these issues, and prompted me to telegraph to the President:
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
26 July 43
Changes announced in Italy probably portend peace proposals. Let us consult together so as to take joint action. The present stage may only be transition. But anyhow Hitler will feel very lonely when Mussolini is down and out. No one can be quite sure this may not go further.
The President’s message to me crossed this telegram:
President Roosevelt to Prime Minister
26 July 43
By coincidence I was again at Shangri La this afternoon when the news from Rome came, but this time it seems to be true. If any overtures come we must be certain of the use of all Italian territory and transportation against the Germans in the north and against the whole Balkan peninsula , 2 as well as use of airfields of all kinds. It is my thought that we should come as close as possible to unconditional surrender, followed by good treatment of the Italian populace. But I think also that the Head Devil should be surrendered, together with his chief partners in crime. In no event should our officers in the field fix on any general terms without your approval and mine. Let me have your thoughts.
* * * * *
The results of our joint action would dominate the future course of the war. I spent part of the same day in setting down on paper my reactions to the Italian drama. In the afternoon the War Cabinet met to discuss the new situation, and to consider the draft which I had composed. That evening I sent a copy to the President for his comments.
Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
26 July 43
I send you my thoughts in the form in which I submitted them to the War Cabinet, obtaining their full approval.
2. I don’t think myself that we should be too particular in dealing with any non-Fascist Government, even if it is not all we should like. Now Mussolini is gone, I would deal with any non-Fascist Italian Government which can deliver the goods. The goods are set out in my memo herewith. My colleagues also agreed with this.
THOUGHTS ON THE FALL OF MUSSOLINI
B Y THE P RIME M INISTER
It seems highly
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