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Authors: Sibel Edmonds
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accepted this position only for one reason: nine eleven.”
“Don’t misunderstand … All I am saying is that we all have big bags of fiascos, scandals, cover-ups and complaints. There is nowhere to go, no one to report to. We have seen and faced worse stuff—especially nine eleven-related …”
Sarshar added, “Not only that, we’re stuck with the worst guy among the supervisors: Feghali. Do you know how he became supervisor here? Let me tell you …”
He then launched into the sordid history of a sordid man, a bureaucrat who clawed his way into his current position by using and stepping on people, committing fraud, abusing his authority (there were charges of sexual misconduct and other outstanding complaints against him), and threatening those who challenged him with phony discrimination lawsuits. Apparently, this last threat got the FBI’s attention and he was left alone—to continue his abuses. The managers all were wary of him.
Disgusted with everything I heard, I was in no mood to talk about the past and told them so, adding only that I was concerned about this particular cover-up and damage to 9/11-related information and investigations.
“If you think this is bad,” Amin replied, “then you haven’t seen anything. This is nothing compared to some other cover-ups that had direct bearing on what happened here on September eleven!”
“Do you mean other nine eleven cases have been similarly destroyed, covered up?”
“I am saying that and ten times worse,” he avowed. “Yours won’t begin to measure up to what we have seen this agency cover up.” He turned to Sarshar. “Do you want to tell her about our case or do you want me to?”
Sarshar got up and grabbed a file from his desk drawer, then came back and sat down. “Sit tight. What you will hear and see will blow your mind.”
Sarshar then began to tell me about the Iranian informant.
The story began in the early 1990s. The bureau hired an Iranian man who had been the head of SAVAK (Iran’s main intelligence agency) as a reliable source on its criminal, counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations and investigations. The man was very good at what he did and had established a large number of sources and informants in strategically important areas within Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Notably, he managed intelligence-gathering operations in Sistan and Baluchistan, two semi-independent regions on the border with Afghanistan.
Once on the payroll, he began providing extremely useful and reliable information. The bureau was so pleased with his performance that it began using him both as an informant and as an asset. On a regular basis, almost monthly, agents from the FBI HQ and WFO would meet with him in a location outside the bureau to obtain information and intel on various ongoing operations and investigations.
The agents needed an interpreter for these regular monthly meetings, Sarshar explained, which is where he and Amin came in. “Around the end of April, two thousand one,” he told me, “I was asked to accompany two special agents from the FBI-WFO … to a meeting arranged with this informant … We met in a park and spent nearly an hour discussing the case, asking detailed questions, and of course, with me translating back and forth. Once we were finished with the session and ready to head back to the WFO, the informant urged us to stay for a few minutes and listen to something very important and alarming he had recently received from his sources.”
According to Sarshar, the informant then proceeded to tell them, “Listen, I was recently contacted by two extremely reliable and long-term sources, one in Afghanistan, the other in Pakistan’s border region with Afghanistan. In the past, these guys had provided me with inside information and intelligence that was extremely hard to come by, considering the tightly based networks and groups they were able to enter and penetrate. They notified me that an active mujahideen
“Don’t misunderstand … All I am saying is that we all have big bags of fiascos, scandals, cover-ups and complaints. There is nowhere to go, no one to report to. We have seen and faced worse stuff—especially nine eleven-related …”
Sarshar added, “Not only that, we’re stuck with the worst guy among the supervisors: Feghali. Do you know how he became supervisor here? Let me tell you …”
He then launched into the sordid history of a sordid man, a bureaucrat who clawed his way into his current position by using and stepping on people, committing fraud, abusing his authority (there were charges of sexual misconduct and other outstanding complaints against him), and threatening those who challenged him with phony discrimination lawsuits. Apparently, this last threat got the FBI’s attention and he was left alone—to continue his abuses. The managers all were wary of him.
Disgusted with everything I heard, I was in no mood to talk about the past and told them so, adding only that I was concerned about this particular cover-up and damage to 9/11-related information and investigations.
“If you think this is bad,” Amin replied, “then you haven’t seen anything. This is nothing compared to some other cover-ups that had direct bearing on what happened here on September eleven!”
“Do you mean other nine eleven cases have been similarly destroyed, covered up?”
“I am saying that and ten times worse,” he avowed. “Yours won’t begin to measure up to what we have seen this agency cover up.” He turned to Sarshar. “Do you want to tell her about our case or do you want me to?”
Sarshar got up and grabbed a file from his desk drawer, then came back and sat down. “Sit tight. What you will hear and see will blow your mind.”
Sarshar then began to tell me about the Iranian informant.
The story began in the early 1990s. The bureau hired an Iranian man who had been the head of SAVAK (Iran’s main intelligence agency) as a reliable source on its criminal, counterintelligence and counterterrorism operations and investigations. The man was very good at what he did and had established a large number of sources and informants in strategically important areas within Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Notably, he managed intelligence-gathering operations in Sistan and Baluchistan, two semi-independent regions on the border with Afghanistan.
Once on the payroll, he began providing extremely useful and reliable information. The bureau was so pleased with his performance that it began using him both as an informant and as an asset. On a regular basis, almost monthly, agents from the FBI HQ and WFO would meet with him in a location outside the bureau to obtain information and intel on various ongoing operations and investigations.
The agents needed an interpreter for these regular monthly meetings, Sarshar explained, which is where he and Amin came in. “Around the end of April, two thousand one,” he told me, “I was asked to accompany two special agents from the FBI-WFO … to a meeting arranged with this informant … We met in a park and spent nearly an hour discussing the case, asking detailed questions, and of course, with me translating back and forth. Once we were finished with the session and ready to head back to the WFO, the informant urged us to stay for a few minutes and listen to something very important and alarming he had recently received from his sources.”
According to Sarshar, the informant then proceeded to tell them, “Listen, I was recently contacted by two extremely reliable and long-term sources, one in Afghanistan, the other in Pakistan’s border region with Afghanistan. In the past, these guys had provided me with inside information and intelligence that was extremely hard to come by, considering the tightly based networks and groups they were able to enter and penetrate. They notified me that an active mujahideen
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