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Authors: Simon Jordan
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beyond comprehension.
After I agreed a price with Andrew for his share in the company, his lawyers drafted up a formal agreement, stipulating the price for Andrew ’s stock out of the proceeds. Other stipulations were made, notably that any offer over £30 million had to be accepted!
Andrew again brought Arthur Andersen’s into the fray and this time I decided to use them, albeit different people from the irksome ‘Giles’ I had thrown out of my office a year earlier, but on my terms. I met Andersen’s, who were aware of the proposed agreement between Andrew and me and its stipulations. I spoke in detail about the market and who I believed would be the likely buyers. I discussed their fees and made it clear that the bigger the sales price they achieved, the bigger percentage they would get. It meant that I could be in breach of Andrew’s stipulation that the business must be sold at offers over £30 million. But I didn’t care, and neither did they.
Selling a business is a protracted and often nerve-racking process. And whilst I had made my mind up to sell, it felt strange: I was selling something that I had put my heart and soul into.
Andrew and I barely spoke. He never came into the office again. Our conversations were short and to the point, sometimes flaring into arguments. As far as I was concerned, Andrew was in no position to make demands. As long as he got what he wanted, everything else was academic. I was not going to engage in petty conversations and arguments with him.
In February 2000, once the polished sales document was complete, I suggested Andersen’s should approach Orange, Cellnet and 121, leaving Vodafone for another day. A quick timetable was mapped out. Documentation with interested parties by middle of March, indicative offers end of March, and final offers mid- to end April. There would then be an exclusivity period to allow the preferred bidder to perform due diligence, and completion by end of May 2000.
As the documents went out, I then told the Andersen team exactly who would buy it and for how much. I predicted it would be 121 and for north of £60 million. I told them of the conversation with 121 fifteen months earlier, when John Barton wanted me to tell him if I ever decided to sell.
In March we got three offers: Cellnet for £35 million; Orange for £40 million; and 121 for £40 million. We were now in play. All three exceeded the £30 million I was obliged to accept under the agreement with Andrew. As these were indicative offers, Andersen’s and I decided not to accept them. We also agreed that this was something that Andrew did not necessarily need to know at this stage.
Andersen’s went back to the bidders with a risky strategy to demand more. It was a gamble I was prepared to take because I strongly believed the business was worth more than what was on the table and Andersen’s agreed. Of course they did – their commission structure told them to.
Cellnet dropped out, to no surprise to me – we never had much of a relationship with them. Orange came back with £45 million and 121 with £50 million.
I decided to inform the other directors where we were at with negotiations, as individually they would profit from the sale. This was a mistake as, with the exception of my brother Dominic, at least two of the other directors lost their focus. I had heard of people when a business is being sold going into the ‘departure lounge’ but some of my directors were sitting on the plane sipping fucking mai tais.
At this stage Andersen’s started to panic and wanted to involve Vodafone. Their concerns increased when Orange dropped out, leaving one bidder at the table, 121. I had had a phone conversation with 121’s MD John Barton, who wanted a steer. I told him to get serious. Days later they came back with an increased offer: £60 million.
Time was against me doing this deal because the agreement with Andrew expired on 30 June 2000. Andersen’s wanted to take the offer but I
After I agreed a price with Andrew for his share in the company, his lawyers drafted up a formal agreement, stipulating the price for Andrew ’s stock out of the proceeds. Other stipulations were made, notably that any offer over £30 million had to be accepted!
Andrew again brought Arthur Andersen’s into the fray and this time I decided to use them, albeit different people from the irksome ‘Giles’ I had thrown out of my office a year earlier, but on my terms. I met Andersen’s, who were aware of the proposed agreement between Andrew and me and its stipulations. I spoke in detail about the market and who I believed would be the likely buyers. I discussed their fees and made it clear that the bigger the sales price they achieved, the bigger percentage they would get. It meant that I could be in breach of Andrew’s stipulation that the business must be sold at offers over £30 million. But I didn’t care, and neither did they.
Selling a business is a protracted and often nerve-racking process. And whilst I had made my mind up to sell, it felt strange: I was selling something that I had put my heart and soul into.
Andrew and I barely spoke. He never came into the office again. Our conversations were short and to the point, sometimes flaring into arguments. As far as I was concerned, Andrew was in no position to make demands. As long as he got what he wanted, everything else was academic. I was not going to engage in petty conversations and arguments with him.
In February 2000, once the polished sales document was complete, I suggested Andersen’s should approach Orange, Cellnet and 121, leaving Vodafone for another day. A quick timetable was mapped out. Documentation with interested parties by middle of March, indicative offers end of March, and final offers mid- to end April. There would then be an exclusivity period to allow the preferred bidder to perform due diligence, and completion by end of May 2000.
As the documents went out, I then told the Andersen team exactly who would buy it and for how much. I predicted it would be 121 and for north of £60 million. I told them of the conversation with 121 fifteen months earlier, when John Barton wanted me to tell him if I ever decided to sell.
In March we got three offers: Cellnet for £35 million; Orange for £40 million; and 121 for £40 million. We were now in play. All three exceeded the £30 million I was obliged to accept under the agreement with Andrew. As these were indicative offers, Andersen’s and I decided not to accept them. We also agreed that this was something that Andrew did not necessarily need to know at this stage.
Andersen’s went back to the bidders with a risky strategy to demand more. It was a gamble I was prepared to take because I strongly believed the business was worth more than what was on the table and Andersen’s agreed. Of course they did – their commission structure told them to.
Cellnet dropped out, to no surprise to me – we never had much of a relationship with them. Orange came back with £45 million and 121 with £50 million.
I decided to inform the other directors where we were at with negotiations, as individually they would profit from the sale. This was a mistake as, with the exception of my brother Dominic, at least two of the other directors lost their focus. I had heard of people when a business is being sold going into the ‘departure lounge’ but some of my directors were sitting on the plane sipping fucking mai tais.
At this stage Andersen’s started to panic and wanted to involve Vodafone. Their concerns increased when Orange dropped out, leaving one bidder at the table, 121. I had had a phone conversation with 121’s MD John Barton, who wanted a steer. I told him to get serious. Days later they came back with an increased offer: £60 million.
Time was against me doing this deal because the agreement with Andrew expired on 30 June 2000. Andersen’s wanted to take the offer but I
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