malice, as according to (1), means they are unlike mere animals that must be controlled but cannot be blamed. It feels natural for us to
blame
the psychopath for a horrific murder and indeed to want to hold him accountable for his conduct, whether through punishment, strong criticism, or indignation. On the other hand, Watson argues, the fact that psychopaths are
incapable
of recognizing others as sources of valid claims on their conduct, as according to (2), means that ways of seeking to hold them accountable to moral expectations are misplaced. We therefore find them deeply disquieting. We recoil in indignation at the callous murders committed by Robert Alton Harris (he kidnapped, taunted, and shot two teenagers, then bragged about it while finishingthe lunches they had been eating). But we can also find ourselves in a more detached, objective mode when we think through his truly terrible upbringing. We naturally waffle on whether he is in fact morally responsible, depending on whether we think of the child he was or the man he became. 12 Ultimately, though, the psychopath isn’t responsible, because he finally isn’t capable of seeing that he owes people something better.
For our purposes, it is crucial to understand why Watson thinks the psychopath’s inability to see the force of moral claims means that resentment or indignation is misplaced: his moral incapacity means there is no possibility of getting through, no possibility of getting him to even
understand
, let alone accept, that he has reason to respect the moral claims of others. But, according to Watson, the act of seeking to
hold someone accountable
, as opposed to simply trying to deter future bad behavior or otherwise keep him under control, is precisely that of trying to elicit an
internal
understanding and acceptance that the claims of others bear on his conduct. Reactive feelings such as resentment and indignation, for Watson, have just this implicit goal: to get their target to listen and understand. That means that resenting a psychopath is ultimately misplaced. It is in a basic way like Mr. Magoo’s “ordering” a fence post to get off his property. A message is sent but cannot be received. 13
In a moment we will apply this argument to the asshole, albeit in a localized way. We should first consider why the argument doesn’t apply as it stands. As we noted in chapter 2 , the main way the asshole differs from the psychopath is that the asshole is capable of using moral concepts and is motivated toaction by his use of them. 14 He might reason impeccably when his interests aren’t at stake, and in a normatively engaged way. He can advise a friend about whether a certain debt should be repaid or promise kept, and he takes offense at a transgression in a way that shows his ability to appreciate the transgressed expectations as providing powerful reasons for action. His moral reasoning and its motivational pull are distorted only when
he
figures in the practical equation, when it then matters that he has entitlements that others (such as the advised friend) do not enjoy. Even then, he might reason just fine about his own actions on a good day or be generally reliable, say, in his family life. (Most assholes are not complete assholes. While assholes are generally “systematic” across many social contexts, only those who are assholes in almost every area of life are
complete assholes
.) What makes an asshole an asshole is the
way
he uses his real moral capacity. He puts that capacity in the dedicated service of confidence in his entitlement to special advantages by reasoning morally but without morality’s impartiality.
We are admitting, then, that the asshole has certain
general
moral capacities of judgment and motivation. Is this to revise our initial proposal that the asshole is blameworthy simply because he has certain moral views? Not exactly. That proposal took for granted that the views are indeed
his
views, in a certain robust sense: they
blame
the psychopath for a horrific murder and indeed to want to hold him accountable for his conduct, whether through punishment, strong criticism, or indignation. On the other hand, Watson argues, the fact that psychopaths are
incapable
of recognizing others as sources of valid claims on their conduct, as according to (2), means that ways of seeking to hold them accountable to moral expectations are misplaced. We therefore find them deeply disquieting. We recoil in indignation at the callous murders committed by Robert Alton Harris (he kidnapped, taunted, and shot two teenagers, then bragged about it while finishingthe lunches they had been eating). But we can also find ourselves in a more detached, objective mode when we think through his truly terrible upbringing. We naturally waffle on whether he is in fact morally responsible, depending on whether we think of the child he was or the man he became. 12 Ultimately, though, the psychopath isn’t responsible, because he finally isn’t capable of seeing that he owes people something better.
For our purposes, it is crucial to understand why Watson thinks the psychopath’s inability to see the force of moral claims means that resentment or indignation is misplaced: his moral incapacity means there is no possibility of getting through, no possibility of getting him to even
understand
, let alone accept, that he has reason to respect the moral claims of others. But, according to Watson, the act of seeking to
hold someone accountable
, as opposed to simply trying to deter future bad behavior or otherwise keep him under control, is precisely that of trying to elicit an
internal
understanding and acceptance that the claims of others bear on his conduct. Reactive feelings such as resentment and indignation, for Watson, have just this implicit goal: to get their target to listen and understand. That means that resenting a psychopath is ultimately misplaced. It is in a basic way like Mr. Magoo’s “ordering” a fence post to get off his property. A message is sent but cannot be received. 13
In a moment we will apply this argument to the asshole, albeit in a localized way. We should first consider why the argument doesn’t apply as it stands. As we noted in chapter 2 , the main way the asshole differs from the psychopath is that the asshole is capable of using moral concepts and is motivated toaction by his use of them. 14 He might reason impeccably when his interests aren’t at stake, and in a normatively engaged way. He can advise a friend about whether a certain debt should be repaid or promise kept, and he takes offense at a transgression in a way that shows his ability to appreciate the transgressed expectations as providing powerful reasons for action. His moral reasoning and its motivational pull are distorted only when
he
figures in the practical equation, when it then matters that he has entitlements that others (such as the advised friend) do not enjoy. Even then, he might reason just fine about his own actions on a good day or be generally reliable, say, in his family life. (Most assholes are not complete assholes. While assholes are generally “systematic” across many social contexts, only those who are assholes in almost every area of life are
complete assholes
.) What makes an asshole an asshole is the
way
he uses his real moral capacity. He puts that capacity in the dedicated service of confidence in his entitlement to special advantages by reasoning morally but without morality’s impartiality.
We are admitting, then, that the asshole has certain
general
moral capacities of judgment and motivation. Is this to revise our initial proposal that the asshole is blameworthy simply because he has certain moral views? Not exactly. That proposal took for granted that the views are indeed
his
views, in a certain robust sense: they
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