Read Online An Artist in Treason: The Extraordinary Double Life of General James Wilkinson by Andro Linklater - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Andro Linklater
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that the soldiers did not again take up arms against the United States, and authorized Wilkinson to accept minor points such as the British insistence that they be allowed to pile their weapons “on the word of command of their own officers” rather than to ground them on the orders of the Americans. What Gates required in return was agreement within twenty-four hours, meaning by two P.M. on October 15.
Hoping that the threat from Clinton might offer a way out, Burgoyne spun out talks past the deadline. In this tense situation, where more than twenty thousand soldiers continued to face each other, armed and ready, as Burgoyne put it, to “rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter,” Wilkinson’s ability to create instant friendships took on unexpected significance. With Kingston he discussed the delights of the Hudson Valley, the fall colors and “the beauty of the season,” and to Sutherland he talked of guns and hunting, promising he would personally look after the British officer’s favorite fusee or shotgun when it had to be surrendered.
An amicable agreement among the four negotiators was eventually reached at about eight P.M. on October 15, and the articles were sent back to the generals to be signed. Before midnight, Wilkinson received a message from Sutherland saying that Burgoyne had accepted every condition, but wanted the terms of capitulation to be called a “convention” between himself and Gates. With his general’s agreement, Wilkinson agreed to the change. The following morning, however, he discovered that Burgoyne wanted to back off, having heard a rumor that Clinton had reached Albany. To hold matters up, the British commander even demanded to count the size of the American army, on the grounds that it had to be four times the size of his to justify his surrender. Gates dismissed this as an absurdity and sent Wilkinson to demand “an immediate and decisive reply.”
This time he went directly to Burgoyne’s headquarters, where he found the gambler surrounded by his negotiators but in desperate form. Curtly Burgoyne refused Gates’s ultimatum and told Wilkinson that the truce would end in one hour precisely, insisting that they both set their watches. As he marched off, Wilkinson turned to Sutherland and warned him that if fighting started again, “You will lose your fusée—and your entire baggage.” Then he, too, walked away with, he admitted, “the most uncomfortable sensations,” because he doubted whether a new attack could be mounted, let alone be successful: “Our troops were much scattered . . . the men had got the treaty into their heads and lost their passion for combat.” Besides, the latest news of Clinton was that he had taken Fort Montgomery above West Point and now controlled the highlands close to Albany. Burgoyne was not the only one bluffing on a weak hand.
The British negotiators, Sutherland and Kingston, were less inclined to gamble. They hurried after Burgoyne and insisted that he must first consult his senior officers before rejecting the agreement. The general allowed himself to be persuaded, and Kingston ran back to catch up with Wilkinson, pleading to have the truce extended for two hours while the consultation took place. On his own intitiative, Wilkinson granted the extension, sending word back to Gates of what he had done. Just before the time was up, a disconsolate Sutherland arrived with the news that Burgoyne still refused to accept the terms of surrender. At this point, a curious kind of collusion arose from Sutherland and Wilkinson’s friendship.
Wilkinson pulled out the letter in which Burgoyne had accepted the original agreement, asking only that convention should replace the word capitulation . While Sutherland listened, Wilkinson read aloud the relevant passages that showed the general’s agreement to every other condition. Had Burgoyne gone back on his word? Wilkinson asked dramatically. Was this the behavior of a gentleman? It was the
Hoping that the threat from Clinton might offer a way out, Burgoyne spun out talks past the deadline. In this tense situation, where more than twenty thousand soldiers continued to face each other, armed and ready, as Burgoyne put it, to “rush on the enemy, determined to take no quarter,” Wilkinson’s ability to create instant friendships took on unexpected significance. With Kingston he discussed the delights of the Hudson Valley, the fall colors and “the beauty of the season,” and to Sutherland he talked of guns and hunting, promising he would personally look after the British officer’s favorite fusee or shotgun when it had to be surrendered.
An amicable agreement among the four negotiators was eventually reached at about eight P.M. on October 15, and the articles were sent back to the generals to be signed. Before midnight, Wilkinson received a message from Sutherland saying that Burgoyne had accepted every condition, but wanted the terms of capitulation to be called a “convention” between himself and Gates. With his general’s agreement, Wilkinson agreed to the change. The following morning, however, he discovered that Burgoyne wanted to back off, having heard a rumor that Clinton had reached Albany. To hold matters up, the British commander even demanded to count the size of the American army, on the grounds that it had to be four times the size of his to justify his surrender. Gates dismissed this as an absurdity and sent Wilkinson to demand “an immediate and decisive reply.”
This time he went directly to Burgoyne’s headquarters, where he found the gambler surrounded by his negotiators but in desperate form. Curtly Burgoyne refused Gates’s ultimatum and told Wilkinson that the truce would end in one hour precisely, insisting that they both set their watches. As he marched off, Wilkinson turned to Sutherland and warned him that if fighting started again, “You will lose your fusée—and your entire baggage.” Then he, too, walked away with, he admitted, “the most uncomfortable sensations,” because he doubted whether a new attack could be mounted, let alone be successful: “Our troops were much scattered . . . the men had got the treaty into their heads and lost their passion for combat.” Besides, the latest news of Clinton was that he had taken Fort Montgomery above West Point and now controlled the highlands close to Albany. Burgoyne was not the only one bluffing on a weak hand.
The British negotiators, Sutherland and Kingston, were less inclined to gamble. They hurried after Burgoyne and insisted that he must first consult his senior officers before rejecting the agreement. The general allowed himself to be persuaded, and Kingston ran back to catch up with Wilkinson, pleading to have the truce extended for two hours while the consultation took place. On his own intitiative, Wilkinson granted the extension, sending word back to Gates of what he had done. Just before the time was up, a disconsolate Sutherland arrived with the news that Burgoyne still refused to accept the terms of surrender. At this point, a curious kind of collusion arose from Sutherland and Wilkinson’s friendship.
Wilkinson pulled out the letter in which Burgoyne had accepted the original agreement, asking only that convention should replace the word capitulation . While Sutherland listened, Wilkinson read aloud the relevant passages that showed the general’s agreement to every other condition. Had Burgoyne gone back on his word? Wilkinson asked dramatically. Was this the behavior of a gentleman? It was the
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