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18 It is, therefore, not unlikely that Gaunt either encountered Reilly while in Manchuria or had heard stories of his alleged spying there.
    Although Richard Deacon’s stated belief that Reilly’s Japanese intelligence contact was Col. Akashi Motojiro is not supported by Akashi’s own records, 19 a letter written by Reilly to an unknown correspondent simply referred to as ‘ECF’, on 3 December 1902, does clearly suggest that he did have an interest and knowledge of intelligence matters at this time:
    The Manchu’s are finished. It is only a matter of time before China becomes the playground of the great powers. Their intelligence service, such as it is, for all practical purposes simply does not exist. But I should warn you that in this vacuum which is left a new and much more dangerous Secret Service will eventually spring up. Today it is like a sperm in the womb. Tomorrow? Perhaps a fully fledged child. 20
    Although not stated openly in the letter, the ‘sperm in the womb’ can only mean the Japanese Secret Service, who had a growing network of agents in Manchuria at this time to help them gauge Russian intentions. Britain was also keeping a watching brief on developments in the area through its Military and Naval Intelligence Departments with a view to her future policy. Her first preference would have been an agreement with the Russians to preserve the status quo in the region. Unable to achieve this objective, Britain concluded a treaty with Japan in January 1902, by which she hoped to achieve the next best thing. At the time of the treaty, the Japanese had six capital ships, Russia six, France six and Britain four. Under the treaty, Britain or Japan would come to the other’s aid in the event of one of them being at war with more than one of the other great powers. Should Japan be unable to get the Russians to come to some agreement concerning their ongoing expansionism, the treaty would at least now make it possible for Japan to contemplate war with Russia as a last resort, in the full knowledge that the French would be kept in check by the British.
    Understandably, Britain took a greater degree of interest after the treaty and particularly as tensions between the Russians and the Japanese were seen to be heightening. War Office Military Intelligence records confirm that in 1903, ‘the first four officers were sent to Japan as language students’. 21 The thrust of Britain’s intelligence gathering was therefore through the armed forces, although this is not to discount informationpicked up by diplomatic posts and newspaper correspondents. Russian espionage files, for example, refer to a Daily Telegraph corres-pondent in Manchuria, a retired lieutenant colonel, Joseph Newman, who appears to have been well connected within the European business community. 22 He would, more than likely, have relayed back anything of interest he had heard and could well have come across Reilly during his stint in Manchuria. Whoever Reilly was supplying information to, it was certainly not the Russians. While not expecting to lose any future conflict with Japan, they were certainly sensitive to Japanese efforts to obtain information about Port Arthur and were keen to keep a watchful eye on those suspected of being foreign spies, particularly among the European residents of Port Arthur. Comprehensive records still exist in Moscow, providing a wealth of detail about the numerous agents they themselves were running in Port Arthur and in the region generally. 23 Reilly’s name is nowhere to be seen.
    When the inevitable conflict between Russia and Japan broke out into open hostility on 8 February 1904, it was as a result of a surprise Japanese attack against the Russian Pacific fleet at Port Arthur. With no declaration of war prior to the attack, it bore many of the hallmarks that would characterise the assault on the American Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor some thirty-six years later. Although the attack on Pearl Harbor was carried