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Authors: Robert M Gates
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to tackle them, how various individuals were performing and whether that was good enough, and think through strategies for implementing the change agenda.
—
I mentioned earlier that a new leader’s strategy needs to include carefully choosing his lieutenants. This is important because he must delegate leadership and implementation of specific initiatives on his agenda for change whenever possible. Those surrogates must be chosen carefully to ensure that they can deliver results that accomplish the established goals on time and then can lead the effort to gain acceptance and, where necessary, approval.
However, on some initiatives, a leader must lead the effort personally, must be seen doing it—and must take the time to do so. Most of the challenges I faced at the Defense Department were rooted in a structure so complex, cutting across so many organizations, that no one person or entity below the secretary had the authority or resources to solve most problems, including getting the right equipment to the front lines and canceling major programs. Accordingly, more than at either the CIA or A&M, I had to be personally and routinely involved in virtually every consequential initiative and change on my agenda. As an example, in selecting the thirty-odd major acquisition programs to cut in early 2009, I chaired forty meetings over a period of just two months. I met with the task force charged with overseeing the production of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) armored vehicles every two weeks; the same was true of most other initiatives related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the chairs of the task forces were exceptionally able, it routinely required my personal involvement to keep the bureaucracy from smothering their efforts. When we set out in 2010 to reduce projected Pentagon overhead spending—by $180 billion, as I mentioned earlier—between mid-May and mid-December I chaired sixty meetings ranging in length from one to eight hours.
The situation was completely different at A&M and the CIA. In both places, I made wide use of task forces and councils, but other than periodic updates I spent little time with them until their work was complete. The important thing in these circumstances is to prepare a strong and detailed charter for the work of such groups and then to choose men and women to lead them who not only agree with the overall agenda for change (if not the particulars; after all, you do want creativity and give-and-take) but also by virtue of their institutional role and personal reputation can win wide support for those changes. Also, in both places, I assigned my special assistant at the CIA and my chief of staff at A&M responsibility for monitoring the task forces and reporting to me whether they were on track and coming to conclusions compatible with my agenda.
—
A transformational leader needs to set priorities in his reform agenda, decide how to sequence his initiatives, and develop creative strategies for change well suited to the specific institution he heads. One size does not fit all. In doing these things, a leader is able to shape the bureaucratic battlefield in ways that significantly enhance the chances for success.
The greatest American presidents have three or four major accomplishments for which they are remembered. If a leader is too ambitious, he will dissipate his energy and focus, lose momentum, and fail. Within the broader agenda for change, a leader must choose his priorities with great care.
Too many leaders give too little thought to which change initiatives ought to be launched early and which should wait. When a leader initially surveys the bureaucratic battlefield, he needs to determine which of his initiatives for change are going to be greeted with enthusiasm and broad support and which are going to provoke the greatest opposition. Whenever possible, the popular changes should be made first and the tougher ones later. By successfully effecting changes
—
I mentioned earlier that a new leader’s strategy needs to include carefully choosing his lieutenants. This is important because he must delegate leadership and implementation of specific initiatives on his agenda for change whenever possible. Those surrogates must be chosen carefully to ensure that they can deliver results that accomplish the established goals on time and then can lead the effort to gain acceptance and, where necessary, approval.
However, on some initiatives, a leader must lead the effort personally, must be seen doing it—and must take the time to do so. Most of the challenges I faced at the Defense Department were rooted in a structure so complex, cutting across so many organizations, that no one person or entity below the secretary had the authority or resources to solve most problems, including getting the right equipment to the front lines and canceling major programs. Accordingly, more than at either the CIA or A&M, I had to be personally and routinely involved in virtually every consequential initiative and change on my agenda. As an example, in selecting the thirty-odd major acquisition programs to cut in early 2009, I chaired forty meetings over a period of just two months. I met with the task force charged with overseeing the production of the mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) armored vehicles every two weeks; the same was true of most other initiatives related to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the chairs of the task forces were exceptionally able, it routinely required my personal involvement to keep the bureaucracy from smothering their efforts. When we set out in 2010 to reduce projected Pentagon overhead spending—by $180 billion, as I mentioned earlier—between mid-May and mid-December I chaired sixty meetings ranging in length from one to eight hours.
The situation was completely different at A&M and the CIA. In both places, I made wide use of task forces and councils, but other than periodic updates I spent little time with them until their work was complete. The important thing in these circumstances is to prepare a strong and detailed charter for the work of such groups and then to choose men and women to lead them who not only agree with the overall agenda for change (if not the particulars; after all, you do want creativity and give-and-take) but also by virtue of their institutional role and personal reputation can win wide support for those changes. Also, in both places, I assigned my special assistant at the CIA and my chief of staff at A&M responsibility for monitoring the task forces and reporting to me whether they were on track and coming to conclusions compatible with my agenda.
—
A transformational leader needs to set priorities in his reform agenda, decide how to sequence his initiatives, and develop creative strategies for change well suited to the specific institution he heads. One size does not fit all. In doing these things, a leader is able to shape the bureaucratic battlefield in ways that significantly enhance the chances for success.
The greatest American presidents have three or four major accomplishments for which they are remembered. If a leader is too ambitious, he will dissipate his energy and focus, lose momentum, and fail. Within the broader agenda for change, a leader must choose his priorities with great care.
Too many leaders give too little thought to which change initiatives ought to be launched early and which should wait. When a leader initially surveys the bureaucratic battlefield, he needs to determine which of his initiatives for change are going to be greeted with enthusiasm and broad support and which are going to provoke the greatest opposition. Whenever possible, the popular changes should be made first and the tougher ones later. By successfully effecting changes
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