in Vatutin’s and Golikov’s operations—was rudely shattered on his receipt of formal Stavka orders (copies to Vasilevskii, Vatutin, Rokossovskii and Yeremenko):
(1)The Supreme Commander’s Stavka considers that comrade Voronov has in a thoroughly satisfactory manner carried out his assignment of co-ordinating the operations of the South-Western and the Voronezh Fronts, and moreover, since 6th Army (Voronezh Front) has been subordinated to the command of South-Western Front, comrade Voronov’s mission may be considered to have come to an end.
(2)Comrade Voronov is assigned to the area of the Don and Stalingrad Fronts in the capacity as deputy to comrade Vasilevskii for duties connected with the liquidation of the encircled enemy troops.
(3)Comrade Voronov as a Stavka representative and deputy to comrade Vasilevskii is instructed to present not later than 21.12.42 to the Stavka an operational plan for the liquidation of enemy troops in the space of five–six days. [ Ibid ., note to p. 74.]
The next day, 20 December, with two senior artillery generals (Velikov and Sivkov) and three officers, Voronov flew down to Zavarykin, ‘residence’ of the Don Front commander Rokossovskii. With less than two days in which to work out a new operational plan there was no time to lose, though time enough fora brief consultation with Vasilevskii before he left to supervise the preparations for the attack on the Myshkova that was scheduled for 22 December.
The first job was to size up the opposition before settling on any plan. Colonel Vinogradov, intelligence officer on the Don Front, presented a report, estimating the strength of the encircled forces at ‘between 80–90,000 men’; asked to ‘be specific’, he settled for 86,000—five infantry divisions, two motorized divisions, three Panzer divisions and three ‘battle groups’. Front intelligence considered that rear-service units could make up for losses sustained by Sixth Army in its Stalingrad fighting, but this would not comprise appreciable reinforcement. Meanwhile transport aircraft brought in supplies and took out wounded or staff officers. (In its early stages, the air-lift had caused the Soviet command little concern, but early in December Stalin had ordered an ‘aerial blockade’ with a proper system of ground observation of aircraft movements and regular fighter interception; Colonel Podgornyi’s 235th Fighter Division was detailed for interceptor duties specifically against the German transports, though the weather wrought more havoc than fighters and AA guns.) Stalingrad was to be stormed a second time, but only slowly did it filter through the Soviet command what a formidable force had been walled in by the Soviet armies. One German transport plane forced down behind Soviet lines on its outward flight carried some 1,200 letters from German soldiers. On looking through them and checking names against formations, Voronov finally saw for himself that the ‘guard units’ mentioned by Front intelligence were in fact nothing less than full-scale German infantry divisions.
Voronov, Rokossovskii and Malinin were unanimous in their opinion that the Don Front should carry the main attack. Voronov himself was all for the Soviet forces on the perimeter being unified into one force under Don Front command and he was aware that the Stavka would not object overmuch to this. At the same time, the stipulated ‘five-six days’ in which to wipe out Sixth Army now appeared wholly unreasonable, after an inspection of the defensive positions (built earlier for the Red Army and now manned by German infantry) and an examination of the strengths of Soviet divisions. Plan Koltso , which was ready by 27 December, proposed one main attack from west to east designed to split the pocket in two: 65th, 21st and 24th Armies of the Don Front would attack along an axis running through Baburkin to the workers’ settlement at Krasnyi Oktyabr–Gumrak–Alekseyevka. With Soviet divisions
(1)The Supreme Commander’s Stavka considers that comrade Voronov has in a thoroughly satisfactory manner carried out his assignment of co-ordinating the operations of the South-Western and the Voronezh Fronts, and moreover, since 6th Army (Voronezh Front) has been subordinated to the command of South-Western Front, comrade Voronov’s mission may be considered to have come to an end.
(2)Comrade Voronov is assigned to the area of the Don and Stalingrad Fronts in the capacity as deputy to comrade Vasilevskii for duties connected with the liquidation of the encircled enemy troops.
(3)Comrade Voronov as a Stavka representative and deputy to comrade Vasilevskii is instructed to present not later than 21.12.42 to the Stavka an operational plan for the liquidation of enemy troops in the space of five–six days. [ Ibid ., note to p. 74.]
The next day, 20 December, with two senior artillery generals (Velikov and Sivkov) and three officers, Voronov flew down to Zavarykin, ‘residence’ of the Don Front commander Rokossovskii. With less than two days in which to work out a new operational plan there was no time to lose, though time enough fora brief consultation with Vasilevskii before he left to supervise the preparations for the attack on the Myshkova that was scheduled for 22 December.
The first job was to size up the opposition before settling on any plan. Colonel Vinogradov, intelligence officer on the Don Front, presented a report, estimating the strength of the encircled forces at ‘between 80–90,000 men’; asked to ‘be specific’, he settled for 86,000—five infantry divisions, two motorized divisions, three Panzer divisions and three ‘battle groups’. Front intelligence considered that rear-service units could make up for losses sustained by Sixth Army in its Stalingrad fighting, but this would not comprise appreciable reinforcement. Meanwhile transport aircraft brought in supplies and took out wounded or staff officers. (In its early stages, the air-lift had caused the Soviet command little concern, but early in December Stalin had ordered an ‘aerial blockade’ with a proper system of ground observation of aircraft movements and regular fighter interception; Colonel Podgornyi’s 235th Fighter Division was detailed for interceptor duties specifically against the German transports, though the weather wrought more havoc than fighters and AA guns.) Stalingrad was to be stormed a second time, but only slowly did it filter through the Soviet command what a formidable force had been walled in by the Soviet armies. One German transport plane forced down behind Soviet lines on its outward flight carried some 1,200 letters from German soldiers. On looking through them and checking names against formations, Voronov finally saw for himself that the ‘guard units’ mentioned by Front intelligence were in fact nothing less than full-scale German infantry divisions.
Voronov, Rokossovskii and Malinin were unanimous in their opinion that the Don Front should carry the main attack. Voronov himself was all for the Soviet forces on the perimeter being unified into one force under Don Front command and he was aware that the Stavka would not object overmuch to this. At the same time, the stipulated ‘five-six days’ in which to wipe out Sixth Army now appeared wholly unreasonable, after an inspection of the defensive positions (built earlier for the Red Army and now manned by German infantry) and an examination of the strengths of Soviet divisions. Plan Koltso , which was ready by 27 December, proposed one main attack from west to east designed to split the pocket in two: 65th, 21st and 24th Armies of the Don Front would attack along an axis running through Baburkin to the workers’ settlement at Krasnyi Oktyabr–Gumrak–Alekseyevka. With Soviet divisions
Similar Books
