populace, that they have to have an answer and that a man who gives an answer is better than a man who gives no answer, when the real fact of the matter is, in most cases, it is the other way around. And the result of this of course is that the politician must give an answer. And the result of this is that political promises can never be kept. It is a mechanical fact; it is impossible. The result of that is that nobody believes campaign promises. And the result of that is a general disparaging of politics, a general lack of respect for the people who are trying to solve problems, and so forth. Itâs all generated from the very beginning (maybeâthis is a simple analysis). Itâs all generated, maybe, by the fact that the attitude of the populace is to try to find the answer instead of trying to find a man who has a way of getting at the answer.
Now we try another item that comes in the sciencesâI give only one or two illustrations of each of the general ideasâand that is how to deal with uncertainty. There have been a lot of jokes made about ideas of uncertainty.I would like to remind you that you can be pretty sure of things even though you are uncertain, that you donât have to be so in-the-middle, in fact not at all in-the-middle. People say to me, âWell, how can you teach your children what is right and wrong if you donât know?â Because Iâm pretty sure of whatâs right and wrong. Iâm not absolutely sure; some experiences may change my mind. But I know what I would expect to teach them. But, of course, a child wonât learn what you teach him.
I would like to mention a somewhat technical idea, but itâs the way, you see, we have to understand how to handle uncertainty. How does something move from being almost certainly false to being almost certainly true? How does experience change? How do you handle the changes of your certainty with experience? And itâs rather complicated, technically, but Iâll give a rather simple, idealized example.
You have, we suppose, two theories about the way something is going to happen, which I will call âTheory Aâ and âTheory B.â Now it gets complicated. Theory A and Theory B. Before you make any observations, for some reason or other, that is, your past experiences and other observations and intuition and so on, suppose that you are very much more certain of Theory A than of Theory Bâmuch more sure. But suppose that the thing that you are going to observe is a test. According to Theory A, nothing should happen. According to Theory B, it should turn blue. Well, you make the observation, and itturns sort of greenish. Then you look at Theory A, and you say, âItâs very unlikely,â and you turn to Theory B, and you say, âWell, it should have turned out sort of blue, but it wasnât impossible that it should turn sort of greenish color.â So the result of this observation, then, is that Theory A is getting weaker, and Theory B is getting stronger. And if you continue to make more tests, then the odds on Theory B increase. Incidentally, it is not right to simply repeat the same test over and over and over and over. No matter how many times you look and it still looks greenish, you havenât made up your mind yet. But if you find a whole lot of other things that distinguish Theory A from Theory B that are different, then by accumulating a large number of these, the odds on Theory B increase.
Example. Iâm in Las Vegas, suppose. And I meet a mind reader, or, letâs say, a man who claims not to be a mind reader, but more technically speaking to have the ability of telekinesis, which means that he can influence the way things behave by pure thought. This fellow comes to me, and he says, âI will demonstrate this to you. We will stand at the roulette wheel and I will tell you ahead of time whether it is going to be black or red on every shot.â
I believe, say,