Read Online Licensed to Kill by Robert Young Pelton - Free Book Online Page B
Authors: Robert Young Pelton
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disturbing echoes of the lists used by the CIA to recruit former Special Forces as contractors.
The ISI military strategy against the Soviets relied on the assumption that they planned to create and defend a series of major military bases or strategic towns and the routes between them. As expected, the Soviets stayed out of the countryside, keeping their central redoubt at Bagram, north of Kabul. They set up fortified firebases and sent out patrols to choke off supplies and interdict fighters entering from Pakistan. Surveilling the base and estimating troop strength, patrols, resupplies, and time for emergency air support, the muj would regularly besiege and overrun these garrisons. The mujahideen were careful to never expose themselves to traditional battles in which they might lose, only striking long enough for a deadly surprising initial blow, and then disappearing in a safe retreat. They used the lessons of General Giap in French Indochina as their modelâthe same tactics that defeated the Americans in Vietnam simply by embroiling them in a bloody and expensive guerrilla war. No one battle defeated the Russians, but it was the long, costly, unpopular war that ultimately forced a Soviet retreat.
The mujahideen used these tactics against the Russians as they now use them against the Americans. In this war, the few modern developments on the ground are the Thuraya satellite phone and the remote-control detonator (usually a car key remote or radio transmitter). The funding of the anti-Soviet jihad created much of the system, the funding conduits, the training, the players, and the tactics that are being used to repel and harass the U.S. troops today. The parallels are striking: today, U.S. policy supports a friendly government and trains an indigenous army (like the Russians), and shies away from intensive ground involvement (as did the Russians), preferring to fly from central bases and to stay in fortified compounds (as the Russians did). The major differences currently are the massive number of NGOs operating with Western agendas, the lack of attention to the educational system, the use of security contractors, the absence of an immense influx of covert funds to support the foreign âinvaderâ of Afghanistan, and the deliberate lack of names for the groups that attack Westerners and their proxies. The Americans view their mere presence in Afghanistan as a victory. The insurgents, however, see tying down the Americans and bleeding their resources as winning. After all, every Afghan will tell you, How long did it take for us to defeat the British? How long did it take us to send the Russians packing? Similarly, the war against the perceived American occupation of Afghanistan could become one of generations and timeless revenge.
The basic propaganda elements of jihad were fixed during the war against the Soviet Union. The mujahideen viewed America, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia as allies but claim full credit for the power of religion and conviction in defeating the Russians and their puppet government. To the Afghans, the war provided one more example of how their country acts as a graveyard for foreign aggressors, even though foreign aggressors supplied the money and weapons to defeat another foreign aggressor. Most Afghan men between thirty and sixty can relate dramatic tales of dead Russians, crashed helicopters, burning convoys, and violent counterattacks. Every Afghan speaks of the jihad with pride, and the experience has provided a wellspring of nationalism. They conveniently forget that in the mid-1990s, after the Russians had left, the same holy warriors destroyed Kabul and massacred its people. Many of these fundamentalist factions provide sustenance for the jihad against the Americans today in Afghanistan, and few locals have forgotten bin Ladenâs contributions as a mujahideen during the war.
The âParrotâs Beak,â or the area of Pakistan that juts into Afghanistan below Tora Bora and
The ISI military strategy against the Soviets relied on the assumption that they planned to create and defend a series of major military bases or strategic towns and the routes between them. As expected, the Soviets stayed out of the countryside, keeping their central redoubt at Bagram, north of Kabul. They set up fortified firebases and sent out patrols to choke off supplies and interdict fighters entering from Pakistan. Surveilling the base and estimating troop strength, patrols, resupplies, and time for emergency air support, the muj would regularly besiege and overrun these garrisons. The mujahideen were careful to never expose themselves to traditional battles in which they might lose, only striking long enough for a deadly surprising initial blow, and then disappearing in a safe retreat. They used the lessons of General Giap in French Indochina as their modelâthe same tactics that defeated the Americans in Vietnam simply by embroiling them in a bloody and expensive guerrilla war. No one battle defeated the Russians, but it was the long, costly, unpopular war that ultimately forced a Soviet retreat.
The mujahideen used these tactics against the Russians as they now use them against the Americans. In this war, the few modern developments on the ground are the Thuraya satellite phone and the remote-control detonator (usually a car key remote or radio transmitter). The funding of the anti-Soviet jihad created much of the system, the funding conduits, the training, the players, and the tactics that are being used to repel and harass the U.S. troops today. The parallels are striking: today, U.S. policy supports a friendly government and trains an indigenous army (like the Russians), and shies away from intensive ground involvement (as did the Russians), preferring to fly from central bases and to stay in fortified compounds (as the Russians did). The major differences currently are the massive number of NGOs operating with Western agendas, the lack of attention to the educational system, the use of security contractors, the absence of an immense influx of covert funds to support the foreign âinvaderâ of Afghanistan, and the deliberate lack of names for the groups that attack Westerners and their proxies. The Americans view their mere presence in Afghanistan as a victory. The insurgents, however, see tying down the Americans and bleeding their resources as winning. After all, every Afghan will tell you, How long did it take for us to defeat the British? How long did it take us to send the Russians packing? Similarly, the war against the perceived American occupation of Afghanistan could become one of generations and timeless revenge.
The basic propaganda elements of jihad were fixed during the war against the Soviet Union. The mujahideen viewed America, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia as allies but claim full credit for the power of religion and conviction in defeating the Russians and their puppet government. To the Afghans, the war provided one more example of how their country acts as a graveyard for foreign aggressors, even though foreign aggressors supplied the money and weapons to defeat another foreign aggressor. Most Afghan men between thirty and sixty can relate dramatic tales of dead Russians, crashed helicopters, burning convoys, and violent counterattacks. Every Afghan speaks of the jihad with pride, and the experience has provided a wellspring of nationalism. They conveniently forget that in the mid-1990s, after the Russians had left, the same holy warriors destroyed Kabul and massacred its people. Many of these fundamentalist factions provide sustenance for the jihad against the Americans today in Afghanistan, and few locals have forgotten bin Ladenâs contributions as a mujahideen during the war.
The âParrotâs Beak,â or the area of Pakistan that juts into Afghanistan below Tora Bora and
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