Read Online Licensed to Kill by Robert Young Pelton - Free Book Online
Authors: Robert Young Pelton
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the War on Terror. However, the CIA and the U.S. military jointly operate a number of smaller, more remote bases like this one. This base must remain nameless, but from the look of the Afghan guard, it wouldnât last long, anyway. Most media attention in this region focuses on the disturbingly Russian-sounding town of Shkin to the south; this isnât surprising since the picturesque mud fort has just played host to one of the biggest processions of journo junkets in Afghanistan. The tours come with premade clichés and cinematic blurbs to spare. âThe most evil place,â the military press officers chirp happily back at Bagram. âSomething out of
Mad Max,
â the base commander tells visiting TV talking heads with a straight face. Even the three hundred or so rank-and-file soldiers at Shkin will trot out âFort Apacheâ or âthe Alamoâ to eager journo junkets. Some journos will tell you privately that the soldiers at Shkin have been ordered in writing by their commander not to mention the cross-border operations or the amount of U.S. artillery, smart bombs, or bullets that are fired toward and into Pakistan. The U.S. military has done the ultimate hat trick: running a covert operation right under the noses of visiting journalists.
Despite the official statistic that nine out of ten U.S. casualties occur here, the mud fort at Shkin may be one of the safer spots along the border with Pakistan. Most of the attacks that have killed or wounded the Americans in the area have been ambushes outside the base. The Americans insist that they are drawing the fire of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, but it may be the other way around. Remote detonated mines wound one soldier, and the easily downed helicopters called for rescue become targets. Forcing Americans to patrol vulnerable routes, and short-burst contacts designed to lure out larger patrols into bigger ambushes, are all textbook examples of eighties-era mujahideen tactics. Though extensively documented and studied in war colleges, the muj strategy seems to have been forgotten by fresh-faced recruits fighting out on the fringes.
The outpost I have arrived at overlooks a well-known mountain pass between the Pakistani city of Miram Shah and its Afghan neighbor, Khost. Miram Shah was a famous supply and R & R base for mujahideen rebels who fought against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, and it remains a major smuggling center. The U.S. military, the Pakistan government, and others believe Osama bin Laden remains secreted in the mountainous Pashtun tribal areas somewhere between Khost and the northern Pakistani city of Peshawar. Bin Laden worked and fought here with the muj in the eighties, and eventually moved back to the area after leaving the Sudan in the late 1990s. Coordinated attacks against Afghan and American forces not surprisingly continue at their highest rates in this region.
I am back in Afghanistan almost exactly two years after the start of the war in late 2001. At the time of my current visit, the U.S. military has just kicked off Operation Avalanche, which will send some two thousand troops and hundreds of helicopter sorties into the border area around Khost in a futile attempt to eliminate remnants of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda network. A classic low-level insurgency has persisted since the end of major combat operations, with significant swaths of support for the Taliban, smuggling groups, and regional warlords making stability a particularly fleeting prospect in this part of the country. With the post-9/11 focus on bin Laden, current events have superseded the historical memory of nearly unceasing warfare in Afghanistan. This was the edge of the empire for Alexander, for the British, and then the Russians. Like a moving wave that eventually sinks into the sand and disappears, grand ideas and great campaigns have met the reality of resilience in the people, place, and idea of Afghanistan. Now Americans find themselves on the
Mad Max,
â the base commander tells visiting TV talking heads with a straight face. Even the three hundred or so rank-and-file soldiers at Shkin will trot out âFort Apacheâ or âthe Alamoâ to eager journo junkets. Some journos will tell you privately that the soldiers at Shkin have been ordered in writing by their commander not to mention the cross-border operations or the amount of U.S. artillery, smart bombs, or bullets that are fired toward and into Pakistan. The U.S. military has done the ultimate hat trick: running a covert operation right under the noses of visiting journalists.
Despite the official statistic that nine out of ten U.S. casualties occur here, the mud fort at Shkin may be one of the safer spots along the border with Pakistan. Most of the attacks that have killed or wounded the Americans in the area have been ambushes outside the base. The Americans insist that they are drawing the fire of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, but it may be the other way around. Remote detonated mines wound one soldier, and the easily downed helicopters called for rescue become targets. Forcing Americans to patrol vulnerable routes, and short-burst contacts designed to lure out larger patrols into bigger ambushes, are all textbook examples of eighties-era mujahideen tactics. Though extensively documented and studied in war colleges, the muj strategy seems to have been forgotten by fresh-faced recruits fighting out on the fringes.
The outpost I have arrived at overlooks a well-known mountain pass between the Pakistani city of Miram Shah and its Afghan neighbor, Khost. Miram Shah was a famous supply and R & R base for mujahideen rebels who fought against the Soviet occupation in the 1980s, and it remains a major smuggling center. The U.S. military, the Pakistan government, and others believe Osama bin Laden remains secreted in the mountainous Pashtun tribal areas somewhere between Khost and the northern Pakistani city of Peshawar. Bin Laden worked and fought here with the muj in the eighties, and eventually moved back to the area after leaving the Sudan in the late 1990s. Coordinated attacks against Afghan and American forces not surprisingly continue at their highest rates in this region.
I am back in Afghanistan almost exactly two years after the start of the war in late 2001. At the time of my current visit, the U.S. military has just kicked off Operation Avalanche, which will send some two thousand troops and hundreds of helicopter sorties into the border area around Khost in a futile attempt to eliminate remnants of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda network. A classic low-level insurgency has persisted since the end of major combat operations, with significant swaths of support for the Taliban, smuggling groups, and regional warlords making stability a particularly fleeting prospect in this part of the country. With the post-9/11 focus on bin Laden, current events have superseded the historical memory of nearly unceasing warfare in Afghanistan. This was the edge of the empire for Alexander, for the British, and then the Russians. Like a moving wave that eventually sinks into the sand and disappears, grand ideas and great campaigns have met the reality of resilience in the people, place, and idea of Afghanistan. Now Americans find themselves on the
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